Daily Report

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Conclusions of Prague CSCE Meeting Reported

AU0312133891 Prague CSTK in English 1928 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Prague Nov 29 (CSTK)— The participants in the Prague meeting of the CSCE Senior Officials' Committee on Yugoslavia, which ended tonight, voiced support for U.N. Security Council resolutions including the proposal to set up an international peacekeeping force to be sent to Yugoslavia.

They also backed the idea of setting up a mission to monitor the observance of human rights in all Yugoslav republics.

Possible recognition of the independence of some Yugoslav republics was not mentioned at the meeting, Czechoslovak sources have reported.

The meeting's chairman, Wilhelm Hoynck, said the committee has as yet only limited possibilities to solve crises like the one in Yugoslavia but they must be used. Greater powers for the committee will be discussed at the CSCE foreign ministers' meeting in Prague in January or at the CSCE summit in Finland in March.

Yugoslav Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Stanislav Stojanovic joined the meeting of the CSCE Senior Officials' Committee in the afternoon, saying he had been instructed by the Yugoslav Government to support the U.N. Security Council resolutions as well as the effort of the CSCE to solve the crisis in his country.

The Yugoslav diplomat also emphasized interest in the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in the areas of conflict.

He apologized for his absence from the morning session stating that it does not mean Yugoslavia is not interested in CSCE activity. He only objected to the meeting being called so suddenly and on Yugoslavia's national day.

Polish Economics Minister on Tripartite Relations

AU0312123191 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 29 Nov 91 p 8

[Interview with Dariusz Ledworowski, Polish minister of foreign economic relations, by Miklos Ritecz in Warsaw; date not given: "We Are Liberalizing Trade Gradually"]

[Excerpts] At the beginning of October, the foreign economics ministers of the "Visegrad Three" stressed in Krakow that they would sign an agreement as soon as possible to mutually liberalize their trade. What kind of alleviations are we to expect, and when will they be introduced in the trade between Poland, Hungary, and the CSFR? These were some of the questions that our Warsaw correspondent asked Dariusz Ledworowski before the meeting of the three ministers in Warsaw on 30 November. [passage omitted]

[Ritecz] I presume that harmonization between the "Visegrad Three" is not totally devoid of problems, given that there are some differences in the functioning of our economic systems, despite our common past.

[Ledworowski] Our experts assessed and analyzed the import systems, market protection systems, and price systems of our three countries. It turned out that there were some differences in the picture. For example, customs tariffs are one of the main domestic market protection devices in Poland. This system has broader branches in Hungary, and especially in the CSFR. There is a different degree of convertibility for our national currencies; in Poland, we have the broadest convertibility because it also covers individuals. Because of these differences, it will be difficult to agree on all areas. Indeed, we cannot say: "I will reduce customs tariffs by 10 percent, and so will you, and then the matter will be settled." Indeed, it may well be that the reciprocal 10-percent customs reduction is easier to incorporate into the Polish market than into the markets of the other two countries because they have other important tools to protect their markets. Consequently, we need to conduct separate negotiations on all product groups. It is important for us to agree on those products that are immediately affected by liberalization. We are primarily talking about industrial products here, and only secondarily about agricultural and food industry products. As for the latter, we did not seem very willing to open our markets even during the negotiations with the EC. Both Poland and Hungary have strong and sensitive agricultural lobbies.

[Ritecz] When could a free trade zone be established between our countries?

[Ledworowski] That is just the goal, and liberalization is the first phase in the process. Liberalization is composed of gradual customs reductions, and suddenly, market protection simply stops. However, this has to coincide with our accession to the EC. The two processes cannot be separated. The abolition of barriers has to take place symmetrically in our tripartite relations, the same way as in the European Free Trade Association.

[Ritecz] Customs union?

[Ledworowski] The aim of our three countries is to join the EC, so ultimately, we want a customs union with the EC countries. That is why it cannot be our aim just to establish a customs union between the three of us. [passage omitted]

Alia, Party Representatives Discuss Elections

AU0312212291 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 2100 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] At President Ramiz Alia's initiative, a consultative meeting was held this afternoon at the Presidential Office among representatives of the political parties that had initially agreed to hold early elections in May or June 1992.

Servet Pellumbi of the Socialist Party, Neritan Ceka of the Democratic Party, Skender Gjinushi of the Social Democratic Party, and Meno Gjoleka of the Agrarian Party participated. No Republican Party representative was present. Kastriot Islami, president of the People's Assembly Presidency; Ylli Bufi, chairman of the Council of Ministers; Zydi Pepa, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; and Genc Ruli, minister of finance, were also present.

The meeting was devoted to the question of new and early elections. The president listened attentively to the views and suggestions of those present and the opinions of the representatives of the political parties, the president of the People's Assembly Presidency, and the leaders of the government. He agreed to support the idea of bringing forward the elections, holding them within the next three months, as agreed at the government's meeting of 29 November. The president asked the Presidency of the People's Assembly and the political parties to decide in joint consultations the nature and sequence of the elections, as well as the necessary legal conditions to make them fully free and democratic, respecting the basic principles laid down in the Constitutional Law and international legal norms.

On the basis of these consultations, the president will determine a final date for the elections by 20 December. The president said that the question of the elections must also be discussed with the other political parties in order to reach a common viewpoint.

Assembly Approves Radio-Television Directors

AU0312153091 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] The People's Assembly began a plenary session at 1000 GMT this morning. The three parliamentary groups of the Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and Omonia took part.

At this session, Deputy Mehmet Loci, chairman of the Parliamentary Mass Media Commission, presented the composition of the Radio-Television Managing Council, which the deputies approved. The Managing Council consists of: Abdurrahim Myftiu, Agron Cobani, Betim Muco, Gazmend Shpuza, Nico Dhima, Luan Hajdaraga, Ibrahim Baci, Mojkom Zeqo, Stavri Ceco, Xhevair Spahiu, Bardhyl Pollo, Kujtim Cashku, Myslim Islami, Petrit Ruka, Jorgo Panajoti, Skender Bucpapaj, and Skender Koja.

The session's chairman, Lush Perpali, because a group of deputies had submitted a demand for the removal of the mandates of the Deputies Adil Carcani and Shane Korbeci, entrusted the Mandates Commission to submit a request for this matter to be included on the agenda. The aforementioned deputies are accused of the abuse and misappropriation of the people's property.

The Legal Commission was also instructed to present a resolution to the Assembly a resolution on national symbols, also to be included on the Assembly's agenda.

The session approved the law on Albania's membership of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Namik Dokle, chairman of the Socialist Party's parliamentary group, took the floor and said among other things that membership of this bank is one of the paths leading Albania toward European economic development. We agree to approve this bill, which is a result of lengthy negotiations conducted with Jacques Attali since his meeting with former prime minister Fatos Nano. We must also thank on this occasion the distinguished Albanian intellectual Ismail Kadare, who was the first to suggest Albania's membership of this bank to the bank's chairman.

The Assembly also approved the Law on Labor Relations. The session ended at this point. The next session will open at 1700 this afternoon.

SDS Council Nominates Presidential Candidates

AU2911201491 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] The closed-door session of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Coordinating Council, at which Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev was nominated candidate for the presidential elections, has ended.

On this occasion Mr. Zhelev reportedly declared that he would not impose his will regarding the elimination of colored ballots and that he has nothing against running on a blue ballot.

The SDS is the organization where I feel at home, and it is quite natural that I should be its candidate. If I am elected president, I will be a president for the whole nation, Dr. Zhelev reportedly declared at the session.

The New Social Democratic Party, the Alternative Socialist Party [ASP], and the Podkrepa Labor Confederation have proposed another candidate for the post of president, namely Mr. Stefan Savov, but he declined.

The SDS National Coordinating Council nominated Mrs. Blaga Dimitrova as candidate for the post of vice president.

Savov Issues Statement on Zhelev Nomination

AU3011151691 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Statement by Stefan Savov, chairman of the National Assembly, to correspondent Svoboda Nedeva, following session of Union of Democratic Forces National Coordinating Council—recorded]

[Text] As you know, Zhelyu Zhelev and Blaga Dimitrova are our candidates, so there is nothing more to say. We have conducted debates on the question because this is not Todor Zhivkov's Politburo and our headquarters are not Smolny 134, as some journalists like to say. This is a democratic forum attended by 18 delegations. We are discussing things and we are examining them.

Naturally, there are always issues which require debate, therefore, I can say that this is a democratic procedure in which one person should not be the unanimous choice. I do not know, perhaps in the Politburo, it was the custom for someone to stand behind every member with a Kalashnikov, forcing him to cast his vote for only one person. This is not the custom in our forum.

In every democratic country a nomination is discussed and when a common agreement is reached, the candidate is nominated, as we did today. We are are satisfied with our choice. In all democratic countries the president is nominated by the political forces, and later when he is elected he becomes president of the entire nation.

Fatherland Party Rejects Zhelev, Changes Name

AU0112172991 Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 25 Nov 91 p 2

[DUMA staff report: "The Bulgarian Fatherland Party Will Not Support Zhelev"]

[Text] The Fatherland Party will not support Zhelyu Zhelev as a candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections because we intend to support a figure capable of unifying the nation and embodying the principles of Christian morality. This was declared by Krum Kumanov, leader of the Bulgarian Fatherland Party, at yesterday's news conference. The party will henceforth assume the name Bulgarian Fatherland Party-National Union because it is frequently confused with the Fatherland Party of Labor, he added.

The party would rather back Petur Dertliev or Dimitur Popov, if they should enter the presidential elections.

Republican Party Welcomes Presidential Nominations

AU0212211591 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 2030 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] The Republican Party of Bulgaria welcomes the decision of the Union of Democratic Forces to nominate Mr. Zhelyu Zhelev as candidate for the post of president of the republic and Mrs. Blaga Dimitrova as candidate for the post of vice president in the upcoming presidential elections.

The Republican Party calls on its members and supporters to vote for the aforementioned figures.

We know both as worthy citizens and courageous fighters against totalitarianism, and we are convinced that they are capable of leading Bulgaria to the rescuing shore of democracy and market economy, a statement of the Republican Party of Bulgaria points out.

Speculation on BSP Presidential Candidate Continues

AU0412123991 Sofia BTA in English 1111 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 4 (BTA)—Yesterday President Zhelyu Zhelev and Poetess Blaga Dimitrova were registered by the Central Electoral Commission as the candidates of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) for president and vice president in the forthcoming elections. The blue team launches its election campaign Sunday [8 December] by a rally in St. Aleksandur Nevski Square, the site where the SDS usually held its rallies while still in opposition.

The presidential elections are scheduled for January 12. They will be won by the team polling more than half of all valid votes.

The SDS candidates will run on a blue ballot-paper. The traditional red colour of the Socialist (ex-communist) Party [BSP] was registered for the ballot-paper of Mr. Slavomir Tsankov, leader of the ill-reputed ERA-3 Movement which coalesced with the BSP in the recent general elections.

Thirty nine days before the presidential elections, the BSP has not yet named its candidate. A special plenum will be held tomorrow to decide the matter. The BSP will disclose its intentions late Thursday night or Friday [5 or 6 December] morning.

High-ranking BSP activists say that nothing is known for certain yet. The BSP could nominate a candidate of its own or back an independent one. It seems that the team of the party's leader, Mr. Aleksandur Lilov, insists on the nomination of a Socialist, while the younger members of the Supreme Council tend to back an independent candidate.

The young claim that a Socialist candidate would mean a "red-versus-blue" race, and the BSP already lost one such combat in the October parliamentary elections. "Whoever is nominated will be doomed to failure. The BSP should better wait, five years are not that long to do without a president of our party," said a member of the supreme BSP leadership. He believes, however, that the often mentioned candidatures of Mr. Ginyo Ganev and Mr. Dimitur Popov are not strong enough to compete with Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. Mr. Rumen Vodenicharov, notorious for his nationalistic statements, is not a good option, either: that would set Turks against Bulgarians.

BSP leaders say that intense negotiations are going on between the BSP and the Bulgarian Democratic Centre [BDC] (Social Democrats, Democrats and Greens that split away from the SDS) on a possible candidate of the BDC to be backed by the BSP. The Bulgarian Democratic Centre first stated that it would support Dr. Zhelev, then backed out. In their latest statement, its leaders said that they would make their final decision and announce it Thursday (when the BSP is to hold its plenum).

The Bulgarian Democratic Centre considers the nomination of Dr. Petur Dertliev, leader of the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP). The Supreme Council of the BSP finds his nomination acceptable—partly because of the party's ambitions to project a social-democratic image. Judging by press reaction, if Dr. Dertliev accepts the BSP backing, that would be tantamount to a political suicide.

The part of the BSP leadership which does not support Mr. Aleksandur Lilov is not much concerned about the risk of a loss in the presidential elections. In their opinion, what matters more to the BSP now is to choose a tendency, a new policy which will bring it dividends in the future.

The Bulgarian Agrarian Party (United), the Nikola Petkov Bulgaria Agrarian Party, the Bulgarian Business Party and a number of other formations said they would support the nomination of Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) declared its support for the SDS candidate [way] back, after the parliamentary elections. Dr. Zhelev faces no serious competition from the candidates who have been registered so far. The Socialists alone are still expected to make up their minds.

Zhelev Discusses Foreign Policy Priorities

AU0112212291 Sofia BTA in English 1958 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 1 (BTA)—The major priority of Bulgaria's foreign policy is the country's integration into the European structures, President Zhelyu Zhelev said this evening in a televised interview about Bulgaria's foreign policy.

The number two priority is to sign bilateral treaties with the West European countries. Bulgaria and Germany have already signed a treaty. The president expects similar treaties to be concluded with France and Italy by the year's end.

Relations with the countries in the former Soviet Union are the third priority of Bulgaria's foreign policy. This country has already signed a protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia. "Protocols will be signed in the near future with the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and probably with other republics," Dr. Zhelev said. "We set great store by the markets of the countries in the former Soviet Union," he added.

Bulgaria's relations with the neighbour countries are another foreign-policy priority, according to Dr. Zhelev. Bulgaria and Greece have already signed a treaty. "A treaty with Romania will be signed by the end of the year. We hope that we will have a similar treaty with Turkey," President Zhelev said. He believes that these treaties are a contribution to guaranteeing Bulgaria's national security.

Balance is a must for a small country like Bulgaria, Dr. Zhelev said, answering a question about Bulgaria's foreign policy strategy based on keeping a balance between the East and the West, between the United States, Western Europe and Russia.

"We are compensating by using new experts," President Zhelev said when asked whether Bulgaria has enough experts to conduct its new foreign policy.

The president described as a "speculation" statements that Turkey is a threat to Bulgaria's sovereignty. "This speculation is used to draw dividends for the party," Dr. Zhelev said without naming the party to which he referred. "Turkey cannot pose a threat to Bulgaria now or in the near future or, in my opinion, even in the more distant future, because it is a NATO member, it wants to be admitted to the European community and is an active

and strategic partner of the United States. We have very good relations with all these structures," President Zhelev stressed.

He singled out the second phase of the reform—structural adjustment—as a major task for Bulgaria from a general point of view. "In our foreign policy we should carry on what we started a year or year and a half ago," Dr. Zhelev said.

Finance Minister Kostov Explains New Policy

AU0312085891 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 28 Nov 91 pp 1,3

[Interview with Finance Minister Ivan Kostov by Aleksandur Angelov; place and date not given: "It Is Too Rearly To Talk About Strategy"]

[Text] [Angelov] Mr. Kostov, you just returned from London where the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development adopted a decision on rendering assistance to Bulgaria through direct investments in our industry and agriculture. Nevertheless, what are the conditions for this assistance?

[Kostov] There are no conditions whatsoever, people are just trying to support the Bulgarian reform. As a matter of fact, the only condition for the investments to begin flowing in is the drafting of good projects both by our state and private companies.

[Angelov] Has there been any talk about specific projects? When the managers of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development recently visited our country some companies had already prepared their offers.

[Kostov] No, we did not deal with specific projects. This is not a minister's concern. He does not intend to take people by the hand and lead them to the bank. Those days are over; today everyone should take care of himself. No foreign banker, and least of all one from a Western country, would think of touring the enterprises and asking people if they want investments.

[Angelov] Recently, the opinion prevails that Bulgarian companies would rather go bankrupt than trying to restore themselves without foreign assistance. What is your opinion on this matter?

[Kostov] Bulgaria really needs foreign aid for its economic restoration and development. Foreign assistance is likely to act as a catalyst in our economic revival. Therefore, we can say that foreign aid is needed as a catalyst of Bulgarian economic revival, but not as a source of restoration. In London they asked us to report in detail on the financial resources we have been granted so far—they asked for precise data on state and location of the amounts—and they were fully satisfied with our reply when we told them that we have not spent the amounts in question as yet.

[Angelov] When are we going to begin spending?

[Kostov] Only when our economy is ready for investments. The money is deposited as a hard currency reserve in our central bank.

[Angelov] Prior to the elections you said that, unlike the previous government, the present cabinet should adopt a working strategic program by December 1991. Can you say that it is ready?

[Kostov] I think that such a strategic program needs a certain period of preparation. In addition to this, we depend on the method according to which our future agreements with the International Monetary Fund are expected to be worked out. The question is whether we must develop a stabilization program for another year, or whether we can go over to a three-year structural program. This is very important. If we should start a structural reorganization program, then we are expected to develop at last a strategic medium- range draft project. If we should need one more year for economic stabilization—namely, if it should be estimated that our stabilization has not been completed—than it may be too early for working on a strategy.

[Angelov] Does that mean that we must wait another three months for the next revision of the International Monetary Fund before we clarify our further development?

[Kostov] Yes.

[Angelov] Thank you for the interview.

Deputy Minister Explains Privatization Progress

AU0212194191 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 27 Nov 91 p 5

[Interview with Valeri Tsekov, deputy minister of industry and trade, by Aleksandur Angelov; place and date not given: "Either Privatization With Conflicts or Neither Conflicts Nor Privatization"]

[Excerpts] [Angelov] Mr. Tsekov, what happened to the governmental program on small-scale privatization, which includes about 1,500 trading entities?

[Tsekov] Well, it exists, but it did not attain the planned momentum. We did as much as the Grand National Assembly allowed. You know that small-scale privatization began in the spring of 1990, then it was stopped by a moratorium, which was lifted only in the spring of 1991. Then we again started our work and stopped when the Trade Law that revoked Articles one and two of Decree No. 56 was enacted. [passage omitted]

[Angelov] Nevertheless, could you say specifically what has been sold up to this point?

[Tsekov] We have no information about sales in the municipalities and we cannot demand such information. I am familiar only with the sales of plots and about 50 small businesses in Sofia, and four to five big stores and restaurants in Varna.

[Angelov] The bill on privatization was again dropped from the list of the 10 most important bills in the National Assembly. However, people say that the beginning of small-scale privatization is being prepared.

[Tsekov] Yes, there is a new proposal that will be discussed by the government this week, and immediately afterward it will be submitted to the National Assembly. This law will specify what should be privatized, when, and by whom.

[Angelov] How can you specify something like this is a law?

[Tsekov] In principle, I think that there should not even be a single state shop or service store. However, this is impossible, because the existing ones cannot be sold. There simply is not that much money. Therefore, the decision includes various possibilities. What is in demand should be sold without any restrictions to both Bulgarians and foreigners. The second possibility is to expand the credit possibilities of the banks and allocate money in exchange for a property mortgage. Both sides will benefit from this. Those two forms must be used in a parallel manner. In addition, we must adopt several leasing forms, under which property will gradually be acquired by those who work with it.

[Angelov] People say that privatization is being replaced by long-term leasing—a matter of 10-20 years. How do you assess such statements?

[Tsekov] This is a consequence of the Law on Local Management and Administration that was adopted in the final days of the Grand National Assembly, and on the basis of which the municipal budgets are formed. I am certainly concerned with the fact that the municipalities will prefer not to conduct small-scale privatization, but would rather lease their property in order to guarantee a permanent income and live peacefully.

[Angelov] You yourself maintain that the general transfer of property to private hands is impossible. Does it mean that the notorious leasing of the recent past will be revived?

[Tsekov] One should neither deny the forms of leasing nor turn them into an absolute principle. In essence, the objects will be utilized by people who lease them. To them it makes no difference whether they rent them from the state or from the owner. From this point of view, the form of ownership makes no difference. The important thing is to activate the enterprising spirit of the person who works in the shop. It is important for him to work as the owner of his labor—he should purchase the merchandise alone, and find a rapid turnover for his money in an attempt to increase his profit. [passage omitted]

TU Reaction to View on Tripartite Commission

AU2911132991 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] In connection with the government's view regarding the Tripartite Commission that was expressed yesterday, our trade union reporter Petur Donchev sought the reactions of the two trade union confederations.

[Donchev] The reactions of the two confederations, the Podkrepa Labor Confederation and the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB], came rather late. I now have two documents available, which I am holding in my hands at the moment.

The Podkrepa Executive Council has been in session since this morning, but I have been given the text of a decision that includes the following statement, which I will read verbatim:

The Podkrepa Executive Council proposes to the Council of Ministers that it review its standpoint adopted on 28 November 1991 on the status of the Tripartite Commission. If this is not done before 6 December 1991, it will suggest to the Podkrepa Confederative Council that it review its relations with the Council of Ministers.

The second document gives the viewpoint of the KNSB leadership, and stresses the following: What measures will the government take regarding the National Tripartite Commission for Coordinating Interests and its work? The KNSB will not participate in commissions that are entrusted with pseudofunctions relating to social partnership. From now on, the KNSB will assess its relations with the government according to the government's actual deeds.

An urgent meeting of the KNSB Executive Committee is scheduled for tomorrow. I might add that I am left with the impression that it seems very unlikely that the two confederations will offer unreserved support for the government or follow its instructions without question.

Government Seeks New Approach to Trade Unions

AU2811200491 Sofia BTA in English 1701 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Sofia, November 28 (BTA)—A representative of the Press Centre of the Council of Ministers told the press that at its meeting today the cabinet discussed the future of the Tripartite Commission (government-trade unions-employers). The cabinet ministers stressed the fact that the relations between the former cabinet and the trade unions were rather politicized.

A national tripartite commission headed by the then Deputy Prime Minister Dimitur Ludzhev functioned with the former government. The present cabinet has decided to contact trade unions only on trade-union problems. For that purpose a commission will be set up with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, including Mr. Vekil Vanov, minister of labour and social affairs, and representatives of the economic ministries.

At a meeting on November 23, Mr. Filip Dimitrov and the trade union leaders discussed the question of the decentralization of the Tripartite Commission. Obviously, the

present government will try to foil attempts by certain trade union members to politicize social problems.

Mr. Dimitrov's cabinet has decided not to draw up a programme of its own. As a government of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), it has committed itself to the SDS election programme. According to cabinet members, it is impossible to chart a more detailed programme under the present dynamic transition to a market economy. Each of the ministers, however, will set forth his intentions before the SDS MP's [member of parliament].

Government Grants Aid to Ailing Mining Industry

AU2811211491 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Minister Nikola Karadimov will manage the country's territorial development, housing policy, and construction with one first deputy minister and one deputy minister who will also fulfill the functions of chief secretary. The decree adopted by the Council of Ministers today defines the ministry's main functions, number of staff, and structure, as set out in the report submitted by Karadimov. The central administration will have 160 employees, the National Center on Territorial Development and Housing Policy will employ 130, and the Building Center will have a staff of 45 specialists. The two main divisions will be formed as of 15 December, and the State Inspectorate for control of these activities will also operate from the same date.

At its session today the government decided to grant financial aid of 100 million leva to eight associations in the mining industry. The Council of Ministers guarantees the credits used by these associations until 30 November. The Bulgarian National Bank was recommended to refinance the commercial banks for them to grant interest-free credits over a one-year period for the purpose of improving the serious financial position of the Gorubso, Madzharovo, Ostrim, Chiprovets, Osogovo, Chelopech, Burgas, and Panagyurishte copper mines.

The Council of Ministers adopted in principle a draft law to update the Law on Standardization adopted in 1964. The most important new provisions concern the adoption of the principle of voluntary observance of standards. The requirements and specifications connected with protecting people's life and health and the environment, however, will be binding. Only two categories of standards are established, namely national and industrial [firmenni]. It is believed that the establishment of requirements relating to the certification of products will create legislative guarantees for protecting consumer interests.

Zhelev Adviser Interviewed on Military Reforms

AU0112171491 Sofia PODKREPA in Bulgarian 26 Nov 91 pp 1,2

[Interview with presidential adviser Lieutenant General Stoyan Andreev by Lyuben Lachanski; place and date not given: "Bulgaria Is Not and Will Not Be an 'Unfenced Yard' for Attempts at Foreign Aggression"]

[Text] [Lachanski] Lieutenant General, sir, what is the president's opinion of the recently conducted international conference on "The Army in a Democratic Society?"

[Andreev] Right after this important forum, Dr. Zhelev expressed his position quite clearly that the exchange of ideas about this subject with NATO and Pentagon employees will be of exceptional help to allround changes in our Army.

[Lachanski] In yesterday's issue of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] daily, we saw a commentary headlined "We Can Make the Americans Laugh with Military Reform but Make Ourselves Cry," alluding to the results of the conference and the upcoming changes in the Army. Whom does this publication serve, in your opinion?

[Andreev] Everyone apart from Bulgaria's national security. Since we already have a clear doctrine on security, agreed upon by all the political forces, the government and the presidency, such a serious subject cannot be spoken about in such an unprofessional way. Just as it is a serious matter for the governing majority, so it is for the individuals of the so-called BSP opposition, in whose newspaper this inept invective was published...

[Lachanski] How would you comment on the concepts of "a democratic army" and "one man command?"

[Andreev] I am surprised that the author of the "commentary" in DUMA speculates about things that he clearly has no knowledge of. Yes, it is true that in an army, one man command is much more clearly expressed, depending on how democratic the army is and the country which has created it. All we have to do is recall the war in the Persian Gulf: In both armies there was one man command, but we have the choice of orientating ourselves toward that of Saddam or the other commanded by Schwarzkopf. This is despite the fact that as a commander, "terrible things" have been said about the American general. The outcome of the war is well known, and we ought not to make comments about the U.S. Army such as calling it a "Warsaw Pact army!" The time for such attacks and imperial army doctrines has gone, and most likely for ever...

[Lachanski] The author of the DUMA article personally alludes to your words, where the question of denying "party criteria" is brought up. Do you agree with what he has written?

[Andreev] This is one of the usual insinuations and abuses of my name and post. I stand on what I said about autocratic party rule and the military nomenclature, whoever may criticize me.

[Lachanski] According to the same author, our country will remain for an indefinite time an "unfenced yard" as a result of changes in the Army. Do you agree?

[Andreev] This is a simplification of things by a biased, orthodox partisan. Bulgaria is not and will not be an unfenced yard because our present policy not only does not presume such a threat but gives guarantees for global safety.

[Lachanski] The accusations against the new defense minister are unambiguous, that he has little military knowledge. As a professional soldier, how would you receive him as a commander?

[Andreev] In many of the civilized countries in Europe his colleagues are women who have never served in the army. This argument, therefore, is also groundless when a fundamental change of the army is being carried out, a change at the basis of a civil and humane democratization.

[Lachanski] Is the so-called shadow government, whose organ we were referring to, a help or a hindrance?

[Andreev] When it is a question of the national security of our society in general, of the future of our children who must live in new conditions, then DUMA also must weigh its words and commentaries. As for the shadow government, it must simply know the place which it has chosen for itself....

Zhelev Seeks Market-Based Relations With Soviets

AU2911081691 Sofia BTA in English 2034 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Sofia, November 28 (BTA)—"Bulgarian-Soviet economic relations should be re-established on a market basis," Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev said in an interview for the Russian "KURANTI" newspaper. "The same refers for Bulgaria's relations with the other East European countries," Dr. Zhelev added.

The Bulgarian president stressed the fact that now Bulgaria is establishing diplomatic relations with Russia and with other former Soviet republics (the Ukraine, Belorussia and Kyrgyzstan) and that economic ties would be formed through political relations, but on a market basis. "Bulgaria does not intend to give up its positions in the huge Soviet market," Dr. Zhelev said.

According to President Zhelev, social polarization in Bulgaria is still very strong and it will take a year or a two for a political centre to emerge. Till then, the presidential institution will have to play the role of a centre. That is why Bulgaria needs a strong presidential institution to keep the balance between the two main forces: the Ruling Union of Democratic Forces (SDS) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (formerly Bulgarian Communist Party).

Dr. Zhelev stands the best chance of winning the presidential elections due on January 12, 1992.

Defense Minister Ludzhev Pays Visit to Greece

Signs Defense Agreement

AU2811194691 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1730 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Report on visit by Defense Minister Dimitur Ludzhev to Athens and the signing of a bilateral defense and security agreement by Martin Minkov—recorded]

[Text] The two ministers held extremely sincere and frank talks, which ended with the signing of the agreement, said Greek Defense Minister Ioannis Varvitsiotis in a special interview for Bulgarian Radio. In the minister's opinion, the agreement strengthens the positions adopted by the Bulgarian and Greek Governments regarding further consolidating their friendly relations, including in the security field.

Today's events began with private talks between the two ministers, in the course of which they discussed problems of mutual interest and the (?views) of the two sides connected with regional security, as well as the general situation in the Balkans and Europe.

Later, members of the two military delegations joined in the talks. Attention was concentrated on the specific aspects of cooperation, and the position was explicitly expressed that the bilateral talks are not directed against any third country. Bulgaria and Greece are embarking on implementing their military doctrines, which are defensive in nature, and this is in the spirit of the Paris Charter.

Information was exchanged on the processes of reorganizing the two countries' Armed Forces. Greece has accumulated some experience in this field, and is willing to share it with Bulgaria; this relates to training in the Army and the military schools and the transition to a semiprofessional army as a step toward final restructuring.

I am very pleased with the degree of frankness and openness in which the talks are taking place, Ludzhev told Bulgarian Radio. We are very pleased with the fact that even today we have begun practical realization of what we signed in the document, the minister said.

While the agreement was being signed this afternoon, military experts from the two countries started direct talks on preparing a plan for cooperation in specific fields, including in military industrial matters, to which not much attention has been paid previously.

Two further details are that the General Staffs in Athens and Sofia will be connected by a direct line, and that a high-level Greek military delegation will visit Bulgaria in January.

I will conclude with a remark made by Varvitsiotis, that Dimitur Ludzhev is the first minister of the new Bulgarian Government to make an official visit to Greece, and the talks show that one can only expect an expansion

of cooperation rather than stagnation. I quote this because it helps to dispel certain doubts that were sown by individual items published in the press during recent weeks. I would also like to point out the interest shown in the visit here and the well-intentioned tone in which it is being covered in Athens.

Expresses Satisfaction With Talks

AU3011212591 Sofia BTA in English 2024 GMT 30 Nov 91

[Text] Sofia, November 30 (BTA)—Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev, minister of defence, expressed his satisfaction with his visit to Greece in an interview on national television this evening.

"I think we reached understanding on the key questions," Mr. Ludzhev said. In his meetings with Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis, Foreign Minister Andonios Samaras and Defence Minister Ioannis Varvitsiotis he discussed relations between Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey in the context of NATO, the Macedonian question and some "delicate topics," as Mr. Ludzhev described them, which have not been commented before, such as changes in the defence strategies and the national security concepts of these countries. "We even decided to share our experience and maintain cooperation in this sphere," Mr. Ludzhev said.

He blamed directly the Bulgarian Socialist Party and "certain nationalistic circles," which he did not name, for creating the impression that the new Bulgarian Government is conducting a policy which is impairing relations with Greece. They are using machinations and envoys—both visible and invisible, Mr. Ludzhev said. "We found the atmosphere in Greece poisoned," he said, adding that it took him much effort to change these impressions.

Government Willing To Accept EC Observers

AU0212211791 Sofia BTA in English 1949 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 2 (BTA)—After discussing the situation in neighbouring Yugoslavia the government of the Republic of Bulgaria decided to express before the European Community its willingness to accept EC observers, it is said in a letter to Mr. Rudolph Lubbers, prime minister of The Netherlands and president of the Council of Europe.

At its meeting today the cabinet approved the text of the letter which Mr. Filip Dimitrov would send to Mr. Lubbers.

The mission of EC observers will help prevent the spreading of the Yugoslav conflict to other countries and will make it possible to supervise the observation of the UN embargo on arms deliveries. EC observers will have the opportunity to see for themselves that Bulgaria sticks to its position of noninterference in the conflict, it is said in the letter which the Press Center of the Council of Ministers submitted to BTA.

Delegation Departs for NATO Headquarters 4 Dec

AU0412105491 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] A short while ago a 10-member delegation departed for Brussels. It will have a number of meetings and contacts with experts and specialists at NATO Headquarters.

Prior to the departure our reporter Khristo Khristov talked with Major General Stoyan Andreev, leader of the delegation and adviser to the president on issues of national security.

[Begin recording] [Khristov] General Anreev, what is the purpose of this visit to Brussels?

[Andreev] This visit virtually has a working character. It was agreed upon more than four months ago with NATO's leadership. Now we depart on the basis of this agreement. Our delegation consists of National Assembly members, military specialists, and experts from the president's apparatus. The delegation will conduct talks on specific issues, namely, an agreement must be reached on the further acceptance and training of Bulgarian military cadres in NATO military schools and academies. The most important thing in my opinion is the fact that this will be the first time that we will negotiate on the admission of Bulgarian constructors, technologists, and researchers for training in institutes and industrial companies that develop military equipment for NATO states.

[Khristov] At whose invitation is the visit taking place and what specific contacts will you have at NATO Headquarters?

[Andreev] This visit takes place at the personal invitation of Manfred Woerner, NATO secretary general, and his advisers on issues of science and military industry. It will be part of the contacts with the former members of the Warsaw Pact. This is important, because as you know, in the second part of December the first session of the so-called Council of the North Atlantic Bloc will take place. This is a intermediate structures, composed by delegations of both NATO members and countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact. This will be the first intermediate NATO organ that will work permanently and will coordinate issues of cooperation between the former East European countries and NATO. [end recording]

Havel Addresses Federal Assembly 3 Dec

LD0312163191 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Czech 1210 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Address by President Vaclav Havel to the Federal Assembly in Prague—live]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Mr. Speaker, Esteemed Deputies: In the last few days, I presented you with five proposals of new laws—four of them constitutional ones—asking you to discuss them soon. Next week, I will present you with yet another proposed law that is directly linked to the previous ones.

I briefed our people about the fundamental ideas of these laws before I presented them to the Assembly. Moreover, I asked our citizens to support my proposals. Allow me now to explain to you more in detail why I decided on such an unusual course of action and what is the purpose of the proposals I put forward.

Nowadays, all our citizens, as well as everyone in the world, are well aware that our country has found herself on the brink of a deep constitutional crisis. In the course of the year, I addressed you several times from this platform, and all my speeches were of the same nature: I drew your attention to the fact that such a crisis is a dangerous possibility if we do not reach a consensus soon about the future of our state, and if at the same time we do not build a system of constitutional safety-valves that would enable us to fight the various types of danger that can threaten us in a situation where no solution has yet been found.

I did not agree with the view that the Constitution is not the main issue and that it can be postponed. On the contrary, I have felt that none of the great problems our society faces—ranging from political and economic problems to social ones—can be successfully solved without first answering the question of what type of a state we wish to live in.

My alarming speeches usually resulted in specific proposals and were concluded with an appeal to you to be responsible.

Being aware of the necessity to rebuild our constitutional system fundamentally and quickly, I presented you almost one year ago with my proposal for a new federal constitution to be used as a basis for your work. It has been a year now since a long series of various talks between constitutional officials and representatives of political parties about the future basis of our state started at my initiative. There were dozens of such meetings, and many of us spent hundreds of hours at them.

I have kept my belief that the freely elected political representatives who are responsible to the voters will reach a reasonable agreement.

There are certainly many things I can be blamed for—but in no way can I be blamed for not being active, for lacking the patience and will to create an opportunity for the peaceful dialogue of the representatives of the people.

At a certain time, however, I began to doubt that it was possible to follow this path further without any new impetus. I am not saying that nothing has been achieved. This year, agreements have been reached, things have become clearer. Not even the Federal Assembly was idle. [passage omitted] Unfortunately, the main problem has not yet been solved. We still do not know whether we will be one state or two states, and what form the coexistence of the citizens of our two republics will have. We still do not know this, despite the fact it is high time for us to know. Our uncertainty about this matter is even greater now than it was a year ago. This is an unnerving and agonizing uncertainty, is extremely dangerous, and is becoming more and more dangerous all the time, since society is becoming more and more aware of the negative impact that this unclear situation has on everyday life.

People are losing their faith in the future; they are having doubts about the viability of our young democracy and about the abilities of those who are in charge of it. They have the correct feeling that somewhere in the background of all these uncertainties the most serious one is hiding: an uncertainty about the type of existence of the Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak state. My doubts about the ability of the constitutional officials, representative bodies, and political leaders to reach an unequivocal agreement on their own and without any outside influence culminated two weeks ago, when the talks between the National Councils about the treaty came to a deadlock, when the Federal Assembly failed to agree on the referendum question, and when the Slovak National Council was tempted once again to put on the agenda of its session a declaration of sovereignty of the Slovak Republic as a subject of international law.

I was spending the week in Slovakia when all this happened. I was confronted daily with a feeling of danger. It seemed to me that this feeling is much stronger in Slovakia than in the Czech lands. All this made me decide that I would try to ask for help for that constitutional authority from which the offices of the deputies of National Councils are derived—your offices, through which my own office is derived—constitutional authority that has not yet had many chances to express its views on the fundamental issues of our state; constitutional authority whose constitutional basis is a permanent one, unlike our offices; that is, the citizen.

I intended to encourage the Slovak people to express their real will more clearly than has been done so far and without fearing the consequences. At the same time, I intended to renew the feeling of shared responsibility for the future of our common state in the Czech Republic—which is tired, resigned, and inclined to prepare for a split. I intended to get our civic blood circulating so it can supply limp political representatives with new strength and energy.

I am aware that you found it difficult to accept this step of mine and that a number of you felt it was an attack on your legitimacy, if not a direct attack on the fundamental principles of democracy based on representative bodies. I am not surprised by your reaction.

Nevertheless, at that same time, I am convinced that this was the correct step and the only possible one. Our citizens showed that they still cared. They showed their wish to live in a democratic state and that they wish to live somewhere where the respectable number of laws that you have adopted could be applied. They have shown that they are capable of bearing a number of uncertainties, as long as they are certain on one fundamental thing: that in our country there will not be a state of constitutional chaos; that the working of the constitutional bodies will not be halted; that they will not be dragged down into permanent civic conflicts; that they will make sacrifices that give them certainty about the democratic future of the state.

I do not know whether Czechoslovakia is condemned to succumb to legal chaos, condemned to permanent constitutional crisis, to a crippled state administration, to a chaotic breakup, and to become the domain of political adventurers. I do know, however, that we must fight with all our strength against such an alternative. I try to do whatever I can. I attempted to achieve this, both by organizing and moderating an endless string of political talks and by calling at the end on our citizens to help and by presenting you with those drafted laws that I presented to you.

I am glad, esteemed deputies, that shortly after being subjected to a shock because of my public appeal, you have come to understand the ethos and the overall purpose of my initiative and have made steps to accommodate it.

All my proposals are aimed at achieving the same thing; they share the same purpose and spirit, the same concept and are linked to each other. That is why I appeal to you to understand them in this way. Their aim is two-fold: on one hand, to find the way out of a blind alley where the constitutional talks have found themselves so far and in this way to create a new opportunity for them; and on the other hand, to create a system of emergency safety-valves if these talks continue to be stuck in a blind alley or even lead to a real constitutional crisis.

One of the first proposals I have submitted is the proposal of a new constitution. In it is anchored the principle that the new constitution will come in force only after the National Councils voiced their consent to it. [passage omitted]

The nature of this new constitution, which is unusual in our conditions, only reflects the unusual nature of the situation we find ourselves in, when we are attempting to turn our state into a truly democratic federation based on the equal standing of the two republics that form it. One can hardly imagine that the Federal Assembly could adopt by a clear majority a constitution that is not in keeping with the will of the republics and that could be an object of National Councils' disagreement. It would be especially difficult to imagine this if it was a treaty on a constitutional setup concluded by National Councils, which would form the basis of the federal constitution.

Nevertheless, the adoption of this law would be of great political significance. It would give a guarantee to the republics that, according to law, no other constitution than that with which they agree can be adopted. This law would also embody and constitutionally express the principle that our federation is none other but a common state of our two republics, which form it by their own will, for their own benefit, and which jointly determine its structure on an equal basis.

At issue is a once-and-for-all adoption. Other possible changes of the new constitution would be controlled by the republics in a different way, which would be directly written in the new constitution.

I feel that the adoption of this law could facilitate the talks on the treaty between the National Councils, because it would give them a chance to ensure—and this would be guaranteed beforehand—that the new constitution, which can be endorsed only by the Federal Assembly, would not deviate from the treaty, if it is concluded.

I am convinced that if you adopt this law you will facilitate both your own work and the work of the National Councils.

The next proposal I submitted is the amendment to the constitutional law on referendum. I propose that it is the president who can call a referendum on the basic issues of our constitutional setup, simultaneously in both republics, at his own instigation, and that in doing so he is bound only by the consent of the federal government.

Second, I propose that he is obliged to call this referendum on the basis of civic initiative, or in other words, if 500,000 voters in the Czech Republic and 250,000 voters in the Slovak Republic express themselves in favor. These numbers are roughly 7 percent of the population. [passage omitted]

The president is obliged to call a referendum on a possible secession from the federation in a republic where a relevant number of citizen ask for it. I also propose that the period in the run up to the elections, in which the referendum must not take place, be reduced from five to three months.

The purpose of this proposal is to create an effective fuse that could be quickly used in the event that the referendum would turn out to be the only path toward clarifying our future constitutional setup. [passage omitted]

There is overwhelming evidence that the holding of a referendum could bring light into our constitutional disputes, and that the citizens themselves want a referendum. This is the most democratic way in which

nations can decide about their own self-determination and citizens express their view on the future of the state. In our case, it is even the only constitutional way that can be used to decide on the state's possible division. At the same time, the current legislation practically rules out the use of this constitutional instrument. I do not claim that it must be used. There is still a chance that concord will be reached and that the situation will calm down. I only maintain that this instrument must be made effectively useable, that it must be ready for use, so to speak, which is not, unfortunately, the case today.

And thus, once again, this is a part of a well-functioning system of fuses against the danger of legal chaos or a rule of two laws, which I regard as a more serious issue than the possibility of constitutional division of the state.

The amendment to the constitutional law on referendum also had to be reflected in the amendment to the procedural law on referendum. I have submitted the relevant draft to you.

Dear ladies and gentlemen, deputies, I deeply respect the fact that you have listened to my urgent appeal and to the voice of many of your voters and that you have put both the constitutional bills that I mentioned here as well as the amendment to the law on referendum on the agenda of this joint session, and also that you have started to discuss these proposals in the committees immediately after their submission. I, as a presenter, will not have any objections to any changes that you might make in my proposals, provided such changes will not rid them of their purpose, which I have briefly tried to explain to you.

As I have already said, all my proposals compose one intertwined entity and have a common aim. Therefore, allow me to explain to you the remaining two draft constitutional bills that are not yet on your agenda of this session, but that I have already submitted, however, to the Federal Assembly and that I believe you will also discuss very soon, in view of their urgent character.

The first one of them, in the overall order the third one, is a constitutional bill that amends the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak Federation. It makes some specific changes to the circumstances under which the Federal Assembly can be dissolved and amends the constitutional conditions in the period between its dissolution and the first session of a newly elected parliament.

Our current constitutional system naturally mentions a possibility of the dissolution of the Federal Assembly. It mentions it also because it is expected, since every democratic constitution envisages such a possibility. It mentions it but does not count on it. Therefore, the system in this respect is very vague, ambiguous and incomplete and, in fact, does not state at all what should happen after a possible dissolution of the parliament.

I do not believe that it will ever be necessary to dissolve this Federal Assembly or any following one, and I do not wish any such thing to happen. It would be a truly serious and dangerous shock to our immature parliamentary democracy. Nevertheless, because I know how great this shock would be, I am convinced that we have to be prepared for this extreme possibility and give it some legal norm. I am not saying this because I would like to make it possible for the president or even for myself or for any other part of the executive power to be able to exercise any willfulness or autocratic rule but, on the contrary, because I am convinced that it is necessary to prevent the occurrence of such a possibility by approving a precise legal amendment.

Until very recently, I believed that this matter, like many other unresolved issues, would be amended in our new constitution. Now, however, I have come to the conclusion that it would be irresponsible to rely on this, since it is no longer certain whether a new constitution will be adopted in the foreseeable future or whether a legislative gap or even a constitutional crisis cannot occur before its adoption. I am being reassured more and more often that this view of mine is correct by more and more frequent speculations about a possibility of early elections or about a possibility that some deputies will leave the Federal Assembly forever or will stop attending its sessions, which could result in its complete paralysis. If, however, the Federal Assembly was unable to work and, at the same time, it was impossible to dissolve it and call new elections and when, moreover, it was not clear what structure a representative body should have and under what electoral law its deputies should be elected, then a truly insoluble situation would arise. It would be the more dangerous since it would occur at a time when we are changing our whole legal system.

The amendment that I am proposing is an attempt to implement logical and tried and tested ways—in other systems—for resolving these extreme situations or limiting the danger of their occurrence. In my draft bill, I propose the following:

First, a conciliation process is compulsory in all cases when the chambers fail to agree on a law, and it has to be completed within a month from the date when the other chamber voted on it. This amendment does not merely wish to avert the danger of a prolonged disagreement between the chambers, but is also aimed at speeding up the legislative process.

Second, if the conciliation process does not lead to the same decision, the president can dissolve the Federal Assembly.

Third, he can also dissolve it when or if the Federal Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in the government three times in six months, or if it refuses to express its confidence in it three times in a row.

Fourth, he can also dissolve it if during the entire course of a joint session one of the chambers is unable to vote, or when one of the chambers is unable to vote during the entire course of its own session.

In any of these cases, the president is not obliged to dissolve the parliament; nevertheless, it is his right to do so. I admit that these are hard conditions, but it seems to me that precisely by being hard they can create an effective safeguard against the danger that the parliament will be permanently paralyzed or split.

If a president dissolves parliament, then he must declare new elections, which must take place in two months' time; this deadline is one month shorter than the existing one in order to reduce to the minimum the period during which there is no parliament.

As is the case when a parliament is not in session and its presidium issues legal measures on its behalf, during the period between a dissolution of a parliament and the forming of a new one, legal measures would be issued by the president, and they would be co-signed by a prime minister of the government. This amendment is based on the fact that, with a dissolution of a parliament, the mandates of all its deputies are cancelled, as are the mandates of the members of its presidium, which is only a body derived from parliament and thus cannot be active in the period when a parliament does not exist. This amendment is logical from the constitutional point of view and is also based on a practical assumption that a paralysis of a parliament would very probably mean also a paralysis of its presidium whose legitimacy would be in doubt, not only from a legal but also from a political point of view.

The president's legal measures would of course need to be approved by a new parliament, and the president would have to observe the same limitations when issuing them as those observed by the presidium. He could issue only ordinary laws, not constitutional laws. The president would also lack numerous other powers that belong to the parliament in normal circumstances, such as decisions about peace and war, budget, and so on.

The purpose of this proposal is to guarantee that a dissolution of a parliament would not completely halt the legislative process—a risk that not even a fully stable democracy can afford and, still less, a state facing the task of rapidly rebuilding its entire legal system.

I am aware of the fact that this proposal will be probably met with your massive opposition. I do understand this. As a deputy, I too would perhaps feel disinclined to discuss the conditions under which the body of which I am a member can be dissolved. And presidential decrees are something that, given our situation and our historical experience, causes horror on my part as well as yours. Nevertheless, we have to free ourselves from awkward reminiscences and associations and consider the entire problem in a matter-of-fact way. This is a principle that assumes various forms in the majority of democratic constitutions and that has to be there. It is, in fact, totally natural that no state can afford to take the risk of allowing a legislative vacuum and has to take into account the fact that the activity of one constitutional body, if temporarily out of action, must be taken over by another constitutional body, institution, or official.

I reject various accusations that I intend to introduce a dictatorship, presidential system, or presidential absolute rule, and consider them to be biased, not based on knowledge of facts, and offensive. I am obliged to think about the running of this state, and if I put forward this proposal of mine to you, I am only simply fulfilling my duty. This has nothing to do with my personal ambitions, and I do not wish anything less than that I or anybody else in my post should at any time fulfill the role of a parliament, for however short a time and however limited a purpose. I even hope that the proposed amendment could become a preventive measure—that is, that it would create the conditions that would avert the danger of such a situation.

The second—and altogether fourth—draft constitutional bill that I submitted to you concerns a new structure of federal representative bodies. This structure will also be definitively adjusted by the constitution. My proposal stems from the apprehension that the new constitution need not be adopted by election time and that, therefore, we would not be able to hold elections. The current image of the supreme representative body of the federation, in my view, is untenable because it is impractical, inoperative and completely serving the previous concept of the federation as a certain formal decoration of the totalitarian power. I even fear that the elections to the Federal Assembly, if it maintains today's structure, would not have to take place at all, whether owing to boycott or lack of interest, which would in fact mean the disintegration of our state. At the same time, the elections are drawing near, and if they are to be held by the proper deadline, in an orderly and successful way, it is high time to prepare the election law, which naturally cannot be done if there is no agreement about the form of the future parliament.

My proposal is, so to speak, minimal. Thus, we are not speaking about a new form of the appropriate chapter of the constitution with all its paraphernalia, including new delimitation of all the mutual relations between various constitutional organs, their rights and duties; what is involved is just the minimal necessary adjustment to today's constitutional system. This adjustment, true, can signal changes that will be included in the future constitution; it can inspire the new constitution, but it certainly does not intend to supply it.

This proposal, like my previous proposals, is meant, first of all, to serve as an emergency and urgent safeguard against the danger of political and constitutional crisis. I am convinced that such a minimal variant can be agreed upon much faster and more easily than it could be in the case when you would have to analyze the entire complex of issues related to the new position and mutual relations of all constitutional bodies.

I propose that we have a one-chamber, 200-member Federal Assembly that would elect its deputies according

to the number of voters on the entire territory of the federation. The 200-member Federal Assembly fully corresponds to the number of our inhabitants; indeed, it is higher than in other European states, including Germany. The tradition of a 300-member parliament comes from the time when we were a unitarian state, and there were no republican parliaments. With certain exceptions, suspension of majority rule would not be valid in this parliament.

Apart from this Assembly, and independent of it, there would be a Federal Council, a small 30-member operative body that would equally represent our two republics, through those deputies of the National Councils that the National Councils would elect into this post. Its members would automatically be chairmen of National Councils, who would also convene this Council and alternate in chairing it. Its seat would be in Bratislava.

The Federal Council would have the right to return laws to the Federal Assembly, which then would have to make new decisions about them, in the case of suspension of majority rule. Further powers could then be entrusted in the new constitution to the Federal Council. The Federal Council could not only fully and legitimately safeguard republican control of federal decisionmaking, but could also immediately draw the Republics into this decisionmaking. Thus, today's impractical two-tier system would be done away with, by which the republics are represented by somebody in their National Council and by somebody else in the Federal Assembly. It would also do away with the majority of power-sharing arguments and conjectures as to who is the more legitimate representative of the will of the republics. At the same time, we could dispense with the complicated practice of having the republic parliaments assess the federal legal drafts.

The system I am proposing would be simple, cheap, and clear and would fully comply with the new concept of the federation as a truly joint state of two equal republics that constitute it. The federation would thus cease to be something that is alien to the republics and that hovers somewhere above them; it would be visibly formed directly by these republics. Some of you would also find interesting in this principle the idea that it would enable much better the transformation into a several-member federation. [passage omitted]

If National Councils would elect to the Federal Council those deputies who know the law best, they would then have their share in federal law-making secured directly and easily, and nobody could accuse the federation of deciding something without the appropriate participation of authentic representatives of the republican will. The absorption of National Councils—as the supreme embodiment of the actual statehood of the republics—into federal decisionmaking, carried out in such a way that its representatives would directly create this federal body, would, in my firm opinion, fulfill the new understanding of our federation and, at the same time, would significantly contribute toward its stability. The republics would not only have direct participation in its activities, but would necessarily also feel greater responsibility for this activity.

If I advocate the idea of the Federal Council, it does not mean that I am forcing it on you. It is up to you how you make the decision. The main thing is that you make up your mind one way or another. The election time is drawing near, and I repeat that without inevitable changes in the current constitutional system concerning the representative bodies of the federation, we could easily and very stupidly deprive ourselves of our common state, even if, in the possible referendum, citizens would speak in its favor.

I do not need, of course, to stress how much better it would be if you manage to adopt a new constitution before the elections. There would be no need any more for all those complicated patches, emergency safety valves, partial solutions, and approvals of more and more new laws.

Nevertheless, unfortunately, nowadays we cannot and must not rely any more on being able to achieve this. We have to consider all those dangers that threaten us, and therefore quickly build some kind of safety net that would protect us against a total disruption.

The only proposal that I announced but have not yet presented is for a new election law. I am going to put it forward to you next week, and I am prepared to explain it and comment on it either here or in the committees.

I am not going to jump the gun, and I will limit myself to two remarks. First, my proposal differs from the one drafted for you on the basis of your instructions from the government, because it is based on and will be linked to the structure of new representative bodies that I have proposed to you. It will also differ from the government bill in other aspects. It will not be hostile to political parties, as many of you expect it to be. Second, in democratic states, traditionally the election system is the number one political issue; to decide about it or to amend it is always considered to be a task of supreme political significance. In such a situation, I do not see anything wrong with the fact that you are going to discuss two drafts of the election law; quite the contrary, as this is in fact an advantage. Unfortunately, it is necessary that you reach a quick decision on this matter also.

I am often told by various politicians that our problems would be solved by new elections. I do not rely on this, though I admit that they can solve something. Nevertheless, the more somebody relies on elections, the more he should care for making it possible for them to take place and fulfill their purpose. This requires devoting priority attention to such laws, without which it is difficult to imagine elections taking place according to the original deadline. The importance of this priority attention grows according to the deepening of the political crisis we find

ourselves in and to the degree of danger represented by its various possible consequences.

Esteemed Federal Assembly, the purpose of all my proposals is to offer a method for fighting the dangers to which I have drawn attention for some time now, or at least for insuring that we will not face them unprepared, taken by surprise, and helpless.

Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Government Outlines Federation Arrangement Plan

AU0312164991 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 28 Nov 91 p 3

["CSFR Government Proposal for the Optimum Arrangement for a Functional Federation" approved at its extraordinary session in Prague on 27 November]

[Text] The Federal Government approved a CSFR Government proposal for the optimum arrangement for a functional federation at its extraordinary session yesterday.

A. In foreign relations, defense, and security spheres, it proposes that the federation:

—implement a single foreign policy, conclude international treaties, and provide representation in international relations and membership in international organizations;

—make decisions on issues connected with war and peace and the defense of the state, including providing for economic mobilization;

—safeguard domestic order and the security of the state, especially in the struggle against criminal activities organized with foreign participation and in the struggle against terrorism and drugs;

—guarantee protection for the constitutional arrangement, the protection of CSFR constitutional officials, and the protection of entities of particular significance.

B. In matters connected with the citizens and with guaranteeing their equal status in conjunction with the Document on Human Rights and Freedoms, it proposes that the federation:

—regulate legal conditions for the inhabitants of the state—especially state citizenship of the CSFR, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic—the status of citizens, and the status of foreigners;

—protect the rights of CSFR citizens abroad;

—fulfill the federation's obligations arising from international treaties;

—regulate citizens' basic rights and freedoms, ownership, civil, family, and criminal law, and proceedings before courts and administrative bodies;

—ensure compatibility between the legal code and European Community and Council of Europe laws.

C. The federation represents a single economic unit, defined both by its relationship to the external environment and by its relationship to the internal arrangement of economic conditions. These are characterized by the existence of a single market, as a territory with the free movement of financial resources, the labor force, goods, and services. It proposes that the federation:

—determine the fundamental legal and economic rules specifying equal conditions for all market entities (for example, the commercial code, the business law, the law on accounting, and the law on banks);

—specify macroeconomic regulation and coordination, fiscal and budget policy, and monetary and foreign currency policy;

—establish a taxation system and a system for taxes vital to the homogeneity of market conditions (value-added tax, consumer taxes, income tax, import tax, and road tax), determine taxation rates, and—if appropriate—concessions and exemptions from payment;

—organize the financial system and a central bank with the exclusive right to issue money;

—bear responsibility for the state's balance of payments;

—create homogeneous conditions for a capital market;

—organize a customs system and customs tariffs;

—define possible restrictions on the amount of individual imported and exported commodities, prohibitions on imports and exports, the demarcation of customs free zones, the supervision of the movement of goods specified by international treaties;

—administer and supervise the taxes collected by federal financial and customs bodies;

—regulate the market, prices, and wages;

—create federal finance funds;

—establish state material reserves;

—draw up policies and projects important to the federation and guarantee them financially, including regional programs;

—regulate weights, measures, and technical standards;

—protect economic competition in the single market and legally supervise consumer protection;

—oversee statistics and accounting;

—legally regulate transportation, transportation routes and tariffs, the technical suitability of transportation

means and equipment, the rules for operating transportation, the performance of state administration in railroad, air, and river transportation, and the organization and management of Czechoslovak National Railroads;

—legally regulate the postal and telecommunications systems and the rules for conducting postal and telecommunications operations and for drawing up tariffs, organize and manage the postal and telecommunications systems, administer the postal and long distance telecommunications networks, and utilize the entire range of frequencies;

—issue postal stamps and stationery;

—legally regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of electricity, gas, and heat.

D. The fundamental legal regulation of environmental relations—relations corresponding to the common legal regulation adopted by the European Community countries—a state ecology policy, and supervision of nuclear safety pertain to the federation in the environment sphere.

E. In the social and labor relations spheres, it proposes that the federation:

—legally regulate labor relations, employment, and income policy;

—legally regulate pensions and health insurance and state social security allowances;

—determine the minimum subsistence level and the principles for social assistance.

F. The federation is influenced by legality, economy, and purposefulness when expending resources from the federal budget.

G. Coordination councils will be established in instances where it is necessary to unite the federal and republic bodies' course of action. This especially applies as far as citizens' rights and freedoms, the orientation of economic, scientific, financial, and budget policy, and the fulfillment of international obligations is concerned.

H. The jurisdiction of the federation is guaranteed by an institutional system of federal organs wielding legislative, executive, and judicial power.

This concept, providing a constitutional definition, should be expressed legislatively in the new CSFR constitution.

The CSFR Government views the omission or rejection of some of the aforementioned jurisdictions as a threat to the federation's mission.

Government Issues Statement on Budget Talks

AU0312190191 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 2 Dec 91 p 1

[Statement issued by CSFR Government]

[Text] The Federal Government is aware of its exceptional responsibility for the future development of the federation, and it asks the two republic governments and all three legislative bodies to also act that way. It considers the Bratislava talks on state budgets and their outcome, conducted on its initiative, a solid framework and a basis from which to proceed. It considers any unilateral steps outside this framework politically dangerous and destabilizing.

Therefore, it again endorses the basic principles on which these talks were based—federation, civic solidarity and togetherness—and it receives with satisfaction the news that the representatives of both governments identified themselves with these principles at the 1 December session of the Federal Government and thereby opened the possibility for the talks to continue.

The individual Federal Government members will continue the discussion with their partners in the republic governments, and they will immediately begin negotiations with the political parties they represent, or their parliamentary clubs, to ensure that the state budgets are passed by all three legislative bodies.

On Wednesday, 4 December, a meeting of all three prime ministers will take place. At this meeting, a new political consensus should be reached, so any further conclusions on eventual adjustments to the draft budgets will have to be made after the Wednesday meeting.

Havel Congratulates Ukraine's Kravchuk, Nazarbayev

LD0312183391 Bratislava Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] President Vaclav Havel sent telegrams of congratulations to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Kazakhstan President Sultan Nazarbayev on their election into office. In the telegram addressed to Leonid Kravchuk, he assured him that our country will respect the will of the Ukrainian people, who in the referendum decided by a great majority to support the declaration of independence. Also, Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky sent a telegram of congratulations to Vitold Fokin, chairman of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

Foreign Ministry Seeks Cooperation With Ukraine

LD0312230891 Prague CSTK in English 1057 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 3 (CSTK)—The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry is ready to take steps for partnership

between Czechoslovak and Ukraine in the political, economic and other areas, a statement given in CSTK today says.

The statement responds to the Sunday's referendum in which 90 per cent of the population voted for the Ukraine's independence from the Soviet Union.

The statement says the ministry hails the fact that the Ukraine follows the principles of democracy and good neighborly relations with other states. It hopes it will pursue the same policy in solving all forthcoming questions concerning the Ukraine's incorporation into international cooperation.

Government Offers Soldiers for UN SFRY Force

LD0412001191 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] The Czechoslovak permanent representative in the United Nations Eduard Kukan handed over yesterday to the office of the UN secretary general an official note stating the readiness of our government to offer Czechoslovak soldiers for peacekeeping units for Yugoslavia. The UN officials appreciated the offer by the Czechoslovak Government and recalled that the creation of peacekeeping forces must be decided very soon by the Security Council. However, the Council will resume a discussion on the situation in Yugoslavia only after the return from Europe of the UN Envoy Cyrus Vance, probably next week.

UN Rejects Request for Observers in Slovakia

AU0412122691 Prague CSTK in English 2023 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] New York Dec 2 (CSTK)— Francois Giuliani, the spokesman for the U.N. secretary-general, told CSTK the United Nations in principle does not react to any demands by political parties, groups or movements but only to official requests or proposals by the governments of its member states.

Giuliani was asked by CSTK to comment on an appeal to the world organization by Slovak parliamentarians to send observers to monitor media coverage of Slovakia.

Giuliani said that if the U.N. received such a request, it would not deal with it as in this case only the government of Czechoslovakia is entitled to turn to the United Nations.

Reportage on Calfa's Visit to China

WA0312172491

For Chinese and Czechoslovak reportage on the visit by CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa and his accompanying delegation to China, including reports on his talks with Chinese Premier Li Peng, please see the East Europe section of the 3 December China DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Coupon Privatization To Begin 16 Mar

AU0312151391 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 29 Nov 91 pp 1, 3

[Marcela Doleckova report: "Privatization As Managers See It"]

[Excerpt] If the governments had reacted in time to the suggestion of the Union of Industry, the current difficult situation would not have arisen, Bretislav Ostadal, director of the Union's secretariat, said at an extraordinary general assembly of the Czech Republic Union of Industry in Kladno.

When evaluating the current situation in Czech industry (the Union is an association of the most important enterprises in almost all the industrial sectors in the Czech Republic) B. Ostadal said that employment had dropped 11 percent since the beginning of the year (mostly in the leather processing and textile industry), and another 9 percent drop is expected next year. Earnings rose less than 16 percent, which is only half of the limit imposed on wage increases. He said that the physical volume of production had dropped approximately 40 percent, which was due, among other things, to the decline in demand on Eastern markets. On the subject of privatization, he said that it was necessary to speed up privatization and that privatization is a long-term process in which the principle of individuality must be respected and discrimination imposed by the management must be eliminated.

He stressed that next year the profit tax must be calculated from real profit and not from the "paper" profit, which is the current practice. According to him, the plan for debt elimination is inadequate and the sum designed for debt elimination (30 billion korunas in the Czech Republic) should not be final. He said that the government has the obligation of finding sales on Eastern markets by concluding intergovernmental agreements, and he denounced wage regulation.

J. Klak, federal deputy finance minister, said at the general assembly of hundreds of directors of enterprises—members of the Union— that the economic conditions next year will be no different from the conditions this year, and that the second "big bang" will take place as late as 1 January 1993, when a new tax system comes into force.

Czech Minister for Privatization T. Jezek said that his ministry has received 3,588 privatization projects (of this, about 2,800 are in conformity with the law) and that rival projects may be submitted until 20 January 1992. According to him, however, a large number of projects worked out by the management contain many errors. The Ministry for Privatization is in favor of reducing the current transitional period as much as possible, but the coupon privatization will start, according to his decision, on 16 March next year. In connection with the decision of the Czech National Property Fund to use banks to eliminate debt in selected enterprises, the minister said

that the Fund already has the permission to issue 5-year bonds and that the Fund will acquire the money to repay these bonds by selling shares to foreign customers. Whoever calls for larger elimination of debt calls for a larger sellout, Tomas Jezek said. [passage omitted]

KDH Ministers Object to Government Proposals

AU0312183991 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak 2 Dec 91 pp 1-2

["Statement on the Current Economic Situation and the Situation Regarding the Constitutional Arrangement" issued by Slovak Government and Slovak National Council Presidium members for the Christian Democratic Movement: "Need for Economic Recovery; How To Minimize Negative Repercussions"]

[Text] As far back as 16 January 1991, the Economic Club, operating under the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Presidium, published a statement on the radical economic reform, in which it endorsed the national economy's radical transformation but, at the same time, drew attention to the "essential need to adopt some additional measures to minimize the repercussions of concomitant phenomena of the reform that have a direct negative impact on enterprises and the population."

Some of the measures proposed by us—which, one month later, we formulated in the "Alternatives for the Further Course of the Economic Reform"—are being put into practice, despite inadequate criticism from their adversaries. The economic program approved by KDH Assembly in Zilina [held on 9 and 10 November] had been proposed in the intentions of the "Alternatives."

We are convinced that the economic situation in the Slovak Republic must be improved without delay, which the Slovak bishops also called for in their pastoral letter. This is the duty of the Slovak Government and, commensurate with their representation in it, also of the ministers who were nominated to it by the KDH. The proposed state budget for 1992 and the principles of economic policy now under preparation have prompted us to once again express our fundamental position and to ask the Slovak professional as well as the broad civic public to give support to this position.

The foremost task of the state—precisely today and precisely in the Slovak Republic—is to adopt a program of economic recovery. It is, therefore, important to put into proper perspective all kinds of speculation about the supposedly degenerating economic and entrepreneurial potentials of the Slovak Republic that generate a lack of faith and skepticism.

We consider it our duty to present to the public the following statement:

1. In the more remote, as well as the more recent past, Slovakia was economically active and, in reality, no one has ever had to pay for it. The period of socialism in the Slovak economy started, in fact, with the currency reform of November 1945, when Slovakia was deprived of a formidable part of its economic potential. The industrialization of the 1948-1968 period introduced an economic structure to Slovakia that did not meet the conditions of efficiency. Slovakia only supplemented the requirements of the state as a whole, being oriented toward the so-called socialist camp. This structure now has to be substantially rebuilt.

2. In the past, we often heard the highest state representatives speak about others having to pay for Slovakia, and today we can also hear the same from some post-November [1989] politicians. However, to this day, no stock has ever been taken of the resources genuinely generated on the territory of Slovakia, which obscures the true quantification of mutual relations between the budgets of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. This situation can only be changed when entrepreneurial subjects operating on the territory of each republic surrender their taxes to the budget of the respective republic.

3. The draft of the state budget of the Slovak Republic for 1992 lays bare the unfavorable development of its economy, also in comparison with the Czech Republic. The drop in output means a 15 billion koruna cut in the Slovak Republic's budget revenues. On the other hand, the large increase in unemployment (to between 400,000 and 500,000 in 1992) makes it necessary to allocate in the budget high sums for unemployment benefits (a minimum of 5 to 6 billion korunas).

4. The unfavorable development heretofore can, in our opinion, be changed only by replacing the indiscriminately restrictive economic policy with an expansive policy aimed at development. This would mean a strict separation of the current expenditures of the state budget, with respect to which austerity (restrictiveness) would be preserved from investment expenditures that would lay the foundations for—or, rather, renew—development, particularly the development of infrastructure (motorways, railroads, telecommunications, the financial sector, services), on the basis of special budgetary or foreign commercial operations.

5. The draft state budget of the Slovak Republic for 1992 foresees only a restrictive policy, envisaging a 1.3 percent decline in the budget volume, compared with 1991, while assuming an annual inflation rate of 12 to 15 percent. The proposed formula for the distribution of common revenues (35 percent for the federation, 41.5 percent for the Czech Republic, and 23.5 percent for the Slovak Republic) is disadvantageous for Slovakia, in view of the fact that in 1991 the formula is 35 to 40 to 25.

6. The calculated deficit of the state budget of the Slovak Republic, based on the territorial principle, is not supported by arguments because it does not take into consideration the entire range of resources generated in the Slovak Republic.

7. It is evident that changing the character of the economic policy is a matter of the powers and the responsibility of the Slovak state center for the economy of the Slovak Republic. In harmony with the KDH program, we therefore continue to advocate the transfer of powers—within the framework of the state treaty—to the jurisdiction of the republics. As a minimum, this transfer of powers should concern the spheres of taxes, foreign trade policy, the state budget, and the system of money issue. For this reason, eight members of the Slovak Republic Government representing the KDH did not endorse the Slovak Republic Government statement [of 19 November] on the issue of powers.

8. In this context, the so-called optimal arrangement for a functional federation that was proposed by the CSFR Government [on 27 November] is totally unacceptable. This proposal reserves for the federation all essential powers in regulating the economy and subordinates the Slovak Republic's smaller economy to the "single economic entity," with all the obvious disadvantages for the Slovak Republic that have already made themselves felt very palpably in the course of the economic transformation thus far. We therefore reject this proposal and expect such a solution of relations within the constitutional arrangement as will secure for the Slovak Republic Government the sphere of responsibility, and the powers, that it needs to regulate the economy.

[Signed] Ministers Jozef Belcak, Jozef Butora, Jozef Krsek, Viliam Oberhauser, Ivan Tirpak, members of the Slovak Republic Government; Anton Hykisch, Jan Klepac, Vladimir Kmet, members of the Slovak National Council Presidium; Bartolomej Kunc, Slovak National Council adviser; Slovak Republic Deputy Ministers Pavol Bielik, Jozef Habovstiak, Augustin Jambor, Ignac Prno, Marian Tkac; and Michal Dzatko, member of the KDH Economic Club.

KDH, HZDS Cooperation Agreement Reported

AU0312200191 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 30 Nov 91 p 1

["sla"-signed report: "Busy in the Slovak National Council"]

[Text] Although the 19th meeting of the Slovak National Council will only open on 2 December, its course is dramatic even today. According to our information, a few days ago an agreement was concluded between the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], a member of the government coalition, and Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], according to which the HZDS will not demand the dismissal of Ivan Carnogursky (KDH) from the post of Slovak National Council deputy chairman at the 19th meeting. In return, KDH deputies will support a motion to dismiss Jan Holcik (Democratic Party) from the post of minister of industry and Ivan Miklos (Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence) from the post of minister for the administration and privatization of national property.

MLADA FRONTA DNES yesterday asked Peter Missik, Democratic Party deputy chairman, to comment on this information: "Your newspaper is known for its quick and good work, but I can neither confirm nor refute this report." He added that, if the course of the meeting of the parliament confirmed the existence of such an agreement, it would amount to a breach of the coalition agreements. "We, the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence and the Hungarian Independent Initiative would have to take appropriate measures. We do not intend to sell ourselves cheaply," Missik declared. Milan Sutovec, member of the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence Executive Council, added that the dismissal of Minister Miklos would be regarded by his party as more than an attack on one minister.

Carnogursky's Tribute to Husak Criticized

AU0312100691

[Editorial Report] Slovak newspapers on 29 November publish statements by representatives of the Hungarian Independent Initiative (MNI) and the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence (ODU-VPN), two Slovak government coalition partners, in which they criticize Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky's presence at the funeral of Gustav Husak, the last communist president of Czechoslovakia, on 21 November.

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 29 November on page 2 carries a 200-word CSTK report on an MNI news conference held in Bratislava on 28 November. MNI Chairman Laszlo Nagy told the news conference that "MNI representatives had presented to J. Carnogursky and F. Miklosko letters of protest against their participation in G. Husak's funeral." According to Nagy, Carnogursky's and Miklosko's presence at the funeral "caused outrage, in particular among the population of southern Slovakia, and calls have even been addressed to the MNI to leave the government coalition." According to Nagy, the issue of the MNI's remaining in the government coalition will be dealt with "at a session of the expanded MNI Republic Council at Levice on 7 December."

Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK in Slovak on 29 November on page 2 carries a 150-word unattributed report on an interview with ODU-VPN First Deputy Chairman Jozef Kucerak that was broadcast in the Slovak Radio's "Radio Journal" program on 28 November. According to the report, in the interview Kucerak observed that "paying political tribute to Gustav Husak testifies to a certain loss of democratic, political, and moral criteria."

On the other hand, the Slovak leaders' presence at Husak's funeral was defended by Jan Petrik, executive

deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH). According to a 150-word CSTK report in Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 29 November on page 2, Petrik said at a KDH briefing in Bratislava on 28 November that, by their presence at the funeral, "Jan Carnogursky and Frantisek Miklosko demonstrated Christian magnanimity."

Petrik also ridiculed as "droll" the criminal proceedings that were initiated against Miklosko and Carnogursky by Karel Srp, a pre-November 1989 dissident activist. According to a 100-word CSTK report in Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 27 November on page 6, Srp described the Slovak officials' paying last respect to Gustav Husak as a "provocative tribute to a regime with bloody hands" and charged Miklosko and Carnogursky with "support and propagation of fascism and the abuse of the powers of a public official."

State Bank Chairman on 1991 Economic Estimates

AU2911180091 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 26 Nov 91 p 1

["(do)"-signed report: "Next Year Will Decide"]

[Text] The Czechoslovak State Bank [SBCS] considers price stabilization, an unexpectedly low balance of payment deficit, and the stable exchange rate of the koruna against the basket of convertible currencies to be positive aspects of the economic development this year, SBCS Chairman J. Tosovsky said at a news conference in Prague.

According to an SBCS estimate, the balance of payment deficit in 1991 will not exceed 400 million U.S. dollars. Convertible currency reserves will rise from 1.2 billion dollars (January 1991) to 2.85 billion dollars (December 1991). The gross debt rose from 8.1 only to 9.3 billion dollars from December 1990 to November 1991.

The SBCS chairman said that the drop in production was one of the negative aspects of the development this year. However, he pointed to the fact that this drop—despite accusations that it was caused by excessive monetary restrictions—was needed to make our currency more sound.

In estimates for 1992, the SBCS assumes that, on the one hand, the disintegration of the Soviet economy will continue, but, on the other, the German Federal Republic's economy will rebound. Despite the fact that there still are a number of unknown factors, the Central Bank anticipates that the gross national product will drop between 4 and 6 percent, or 8 percent in the worst case. Presently it is not ruled out that the lowest point will be reached as early as in the first six months. The SBCS estimates that inflation in 1992 will be below 10 percent (unlike the government scenario that anticipates that inflation will reach up to 15 percent), and that the balance of payments deficit will be 500 to 600 million dollars, or 1.6 billion dollars in the worst case. Financing the deficit should be no problem, because the IMF has evaluated the development in the CSFR as being "a textbook model" and is prepared to grant a standby credit that would apparently be used for foreign currency reserves. J. Tosovsky stressed that the SBCS would try to implement a monetary policy that would prevent the 1991 budget from becoming a stimulus for inflation. Therefore, the State Bank, guarding the currency's stability, is against the liberalization of wage regulation.

The State Bank considers the year 1992 to be a key year from the point of view of transformation of the economic system, but the bank admits that the effects of the changes will become visible only after 1992 ends. The SBCS chairman indicated that, for this reason, 1992 will be very complicated from the social and economic points of view.

Katona Summons Yugoslav Envoy Over Missile Fired

LD0312134591 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1300 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] It was said at the Foreign Ministry spokesman's briefing that Tamas Katona, Ministry of Foreign Affairs state secretary, has summoned the Yugoslav ambassador because of the anti-aircraft missile that hit Hungary.

Border Guard Protests Discovery of Yugoslav Mine

LD0412103191 Budapest MTI in English 0952 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 4 (MTI)—After a Yugoslavian mine had been found on Hungarian territory, Brigadier General Balazs Novaky, commander of the Hungarian Frontier Guard, sent a note of protest to his Yugoslavian counterpart, Frontier Guard spokesman Janos Zubek told MTI on Wednesday morning.

He said the mine had been found two metres from the border near Mohacs on Tuesday. The date of its laying has not yet been determined. The mine was disposed of by a Hungarian police squad. The spokesman recalled that some weeks ago the Yugoslavian authorities had promised to remove all mines from along the border. The promise has not yet been fulfilled, Zubek said.

Border Guard Commander on SFRY Violations

AU0312083891 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Nov 91 p 2

[Interview with Major General Balazs Novaky, national commander of the Interior Ministry Border Guard, by Attila Gy. Fekete; place and date not given: "Hot Line for Border Guards?—The Mines Have Not Been Removed Yet"]

[Text] Major General Novaky recently held discussions in Belgrade. Novaky is chairman of the Hungarian section of the main joint committee set up to investigate Yugoslav-Hungarian border violations. During the discussions with his Yugoslav colleagues, he urged the immediate removal of mine systems planted directly next to our border.

[Fekete] Mr. Novaky, what did you manage to achieve in Belgrade?

[Novaky] My Yugoslav counterparts promised to shortly remove the mines that also threaten Hungarian areas along the border. We recorded this in the minutes. However, unfortunately, up to now, we have not seen any signs of this work being started.

[Fekete] Did you find out who had ordered the planting of these mines and why?

[Novaky] I did not find out exactly, but I learned that no military experts or explosives experts were present when these mines were planted. For the time being, we are waiting to see what happens at the other side of the border.

[Fekete] The main joint committees were appointed by the governments. However, do your negotiating partners in Belgrade have an influence on the whole length of the Hungarian-Yugoslav border?

[Novaky] Unfortunately, not. This is exactly why we agreed that the main joint committees would immediately inform the other side about any violations of the border—incursions by aircraft, shooting across, and similar things. In other circumstances, most of these affairs could be settled locally, on the level of the joint committees operating in the border guard districts. However, in the current Yugoslav situation, it is not guaranteed that local information will get to the center, and if it does, whether its contents would be true.

[Fekete] A number of articles have been published in the Yugoslav press on "violations of the border committed by Hungarians," incursions by aircraft, and shooting down aircraft. Did you clear up these matters?

[Novaky] We asked for an explanation of these statements by the Yugoslav press, but without much success. We received a list of where, when and how, in their opinion, we violated the airspace and the border, but no proof was attached to any of these statements. We called the Yugoslav side's attention to the fact that they were not proceeding according to the government agreement.

Antall Views Hexagonale Talks on SFRY Crisis

LD0112204891 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Report on interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky by unidentified correspondent at the Foreign Ministry in Budapest on 1 December—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Late last night Geza Jeszenszky arrived home from Venice where the foreign ministers of the Hexagonale countries discussed Yugoslavia, unfortunately without the presence of the Yugoslav representative.

[Correspondent] The member countries of the Hexagonale met in Venice in the spirit of grave concern about the crisis in Yugoslavia but with the intention of providing help, Geza Jeszenszky said in reply to a question from television news. The foreign minister emphasized that the idea that our southern neighbor would be expelled from the organization did not arise at all at the extraordinary session. Rather, the participants were searching for solutions and internal forces which could be urged toward a sane and sincere settling of the conflict.

[Jeszenszky] The road is open for cooperation, but at present the Hexagonale, even if not paralyzed, is struggling with very serious operational problems, because in practice the Yugoslav presidency does not function. We hope very much that UN intervention with peacekeeping forces can not only bring about a cease-fire but also create the framework for a settlement. The implementation of this is obviously a longer process, requiring the winding up or perhaps a successor form of the state. This framework could already be set up this year.

[Correspondent] He also added that a change of the name of the organization is not ruled out either, since Croatia and Slovenia asked for admission to the organization or opportunities for cooperation with it.

[Jeszenszky] Our aim is not that these two republics should join and others not. We want to keep the gate open for all of the regions.

[Correspondent] What is your view of the announcement of de Michelis yesterday, according to which on 18 December the EC will recognize the independence of the two republics?

[Jeszenszky] Well, I was there and that was not what I heard. Here the Hungarian public and the Hungarian media regarded an inaccurately quoted or not fully understood sentence as a sensational statement.

Katona Assesses 'Rigid Negotiating' With Romania

LD0312165691 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1358 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Exchange between Dr. Akos Gali, independent deputy, and Tamas Katona, Ministry of Foreign Affairs state secretary, at the Hungarian National Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Excerpts] [Gali] [passage omitted] Esteemed Mr. State Secretary: I know that the government possesses adequate information on the situation evolving along the Hungarian-Romanian border. I do not know, however, whether the government, with this knowledge, has taken any recent step toward the Romanian side to improve the situation, or whether there has been any Romanian reply to this step, perhaps a Romanian reply giving reason for hope.

At the same time, making use of the opportunity given by the subject and referring to the words of Prime Minister Jozsef Antall in his pre-agenda contribution at the session of the parliament on 21 October, I would ask the state secretary to clarify to a larger extent, if possible, the steps the government has been taking in the interest of improving Hungarian-Romanian relations, for my personal experience has also strengthened my view that the basis of any movement at the border, any easing at the border, will normalize, improve interstate government relations. [passage omitted]

[Speaker] Tamas Katona, the state secretary of the Foreign Ministry, replies to the interpellation.

[Katona] Esteemed House, Esteemed Mr. Deputy: [passage omitted] At the authorization of the finance minister, the national commandership of the customs police deals with the tasks defined in the legal rule. It has to be seen clearly that here one can do no miracle with some sort of reorganization, simply, new border crossing points have to be opened. [passage omitted]

It is an obligation for Hungary [to open more border crossings], as more than 3 million Magyars live in neighboring countries as a minority, and I think keeping in touch with them is a natural right that no one can question. [passage omitted] The national commandership of the customs police claims that it can take no further steps without a government decision.

I would, however, like to go back to what I said on the issue of border crossing points, border traffic in general. It is not in Hungary's interest to have isolated states or to isolate states along its borders. Our objective is to have neighboring countries, similar to us, become a part of Europe. Therefore we continue to initiate by all possible means, at international forums as well as in our bilateral relations, and fully support making these border crossings smooth, however utopian it may sound, and raising them to West European standards. [passage omitted]

I believe that in Hungarian-Romanian relations plenty of prejudice and very rigid negotiating positions have been making it difficult for us to really come to terms with each other. [passage omitted] As far as we are concerned, we say yes. We find it necessary that not only intergovernmental relations exist between Hungary and Romania, but they be extended to natural ties between the self governments, the economic institutions and organs, ties between the parliaments. That is exactly why the Foreign Affairs Committee's six-party delegation is currently in Bucharest, to open gates, borders, so that this be extended to relations between individual parties. [passage omitted]

I think that all that I have said justifies that we are really interested in a new negotiating approach. However, let me say something else: There is something we would not like to go back to. The Romanian side, not out of spite, I think simply because of a kind of stereotype thinking, keeps initiating that we hold meetings at the highest possible level. This implies the danger that if these are not prepared, if these initiative steps are not made, then they may become unsuccessful, as the meetings between Ceaucescu and Kadar, Ceaucescu and Karoly Grosz. And there is nowhere to appeal then. Therefore the Hungarian negotiating position is always practical steps, in a way that as soon as we get somewhere, let's say on the level of deputy state secretaries, the level can be raised, because then there is hope for success and then we can climb the next grade. This way perhaps the approach, rigid because due to prejudice, can be eased to

some extent. And this is our objective. And once more: Western style borders in the east, too.

Carnogursky Comments on Dam Talks in Budapest

LD0312215291 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas Radio Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Report by correspondent Tomas Borec on CSFR-Hungarian talks on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project in Budapest on 2 December]

[Text] Modest progress has been made on some issues one might say in summarizing the results of today's intergovernmental talks in Budapest on one of the neuralgic areas in Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations: the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project.

Delegations headed by Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky and Hungarian Minister Without Portfolio Ferenc Madl sat at the negotiating table. The Czechoslovak delegation also included Minister Josef Vavrousek; Dominik Kocinger, government commissioner for the Gabcikovo project; and other invited experts. Perhaps the only concrete result achieved at today's talks is an agreement on establishing joint groups of Czechoslovak and Hungarian experts which will also include experts from international organizations. Their task will be to assess individual variants of the completion of the Gabcikovo part of the project from various viewpoints, namely ecological, energy, navigating, protection against floods, etc.—that is, to define what is necessary to make the Gabcikovo part of the project work without the Nagymaros part, the construction of which was completely halted by the Hungarian side.

The Hungarian delegation further demanded that the Czechoslovak side halt work on the project while the group of experts meets. However, our delegation could not agree with this. As Jan Carnogursky said, there is no guarantee that the experts will complete their work in a reasonable amount of time. On the other hand, the head of our delegation feels that the main thing is to harmonize the interests of both countries.

This is one area where progress was made today, at least in that joint groups of experts have been created. Answering Radio Czechoslovakia's question on how the Hungarian side's objections on diverting part of the Danube River's flow on our territory should be assessed, Jan Carnogursky said that every variant envisaging putting Gabcikovo into operation must envisage a diversion of a part of the river's flow and that it is in harmony with the 1977 interstate treaty. We continue to regard this treaty as valid, and it seems to me that Hungary does the same. The question is to find a solution which is acceptable to both parties involved, Jan Carnogursky added.

Iranian Delegation Arrives To Revive Economic Ties

LD3011150591 Budapest MTI in English 1918 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Budapest, November 29 (MTI)—In an attempt to revive Hungarian-Iranian economic ties reduced to a minimal level during the Iran-Iraq war, an eight-member delegation of the Iranian parliament's Economic and Trade Committee, headed by committee chairman Morteza Alviri, arrived today.

The Iranian delegation met deputy speaker of the Hungarian parliament Alajos Dornbach, the Hungarian parliament's Budgetary, Tax and Financial Committee and representatives of the Hungarian-Iranian section of the inter-parliamentary union. During talks, Morteza Alviri confirmed an earlier invitation from Iranian parliament Speaker Mahdavi-Karrubi to his Hungarian counterpart Gyorgy Szabad. On Szabad's behalf, Dornbach accepted the invitation and set the date of the visit for 1992.

Antall Addresses Assembly on Coalition Problems

LD0412113491 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1443 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Interpellation by Deputy Gyorgy Janossy, member of the Hungarian Socialist Party, followed by reply by Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, at the National Assembly session in Budapest—live]

[Excerpts] [Janossy] Mr. Chairman, Esteemed House, Esteemed Mr. Prime Minister: One of the essential components or criteria of the European practice of multiparty parliamentary democracies is the clarity and well-defined character of the relationship between the parliamentary parties and factions. This is a relationship system which, as an important condition or safeguard of the effective operation of parliament, clearly distinguishes the parties of the government coalition and the opposition. This is a relationship system which, promoting the orientation of parliamentary groups and public opinion, decisively influences the parliamentary articulation and structure of cooperation and consensus-seeking.

During the past weeks and months those phenomena which refer to the disorders and crisis symptoms around the coalition which formed after the elections have intensified.

On 25 November of this year, at the plenary session of the National Assembly, the faction of the second strongest party of the coalition spectacularly divided into two, and disintegrated into a group loyal to the party leadership and a group which opposes it.

As an opposition deputy I have no reason or right to intervene in the internal affairs of other parties and party alliances. But even the coalition parties and the representatives of the government must know that disorder around the coalition is strengthening social aversion not

only to the government but also to parliament and the entire political institution system as well. Moreover, it adversely affects the international reputation of the country and Hungarian political life. These matters concern the competence and responsibility of the parliamentary opposition parties as well, in a real democracy.

The prime minister's statement last weekend and the reports on yesterday's talks have already partly answered the questions of this interpellation. For me, there is only one really important question left to be clarified. I am asking the prime minister, as the leader of the strongest government party, entrusted with forming a government: Who are the members of the coalition today? Does he still, invariably, regard the Independent Smallholders' Landworkers' and Bourgeois Party, together with its current leadership, as a coalition partner? [passage omitted]

[Antall] Esteemed Mr. Chairman, esteemed House of Deputies, esteemed Mr. Deputy. I do not wish to dispute whether this question, regarding its content, is really an interpellation. I feel it is my duty to answer, regardless of the fact that it is disputable whether the question, generally, comes with the category of an interpellation. In any case, I would like to ask my fellow deputy whether, after [inquiring about] Miklos Horthy, he should also inquire about Otto Habsburg if possible, and not about our fellow deputy, Jozsef Torgyan. [applause]

Mr. Deputy [Janossy] pointed out in his preamble that he, as an opposition deputy, has no reason or right to intervene in the internal affairs of other parties and party alliances. I would agree with this only in so far as I, as prime minister, do not have the right either to intervene in the internal affairs of other parties. As far as Mr. Deputy's specific question is concerned, my reply is the following:

First, I have said several times and in several contexts, at the plenary session of parliament as well, that as far as I am concerned, as chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, I regard the Independent Smallholders' Party as well as the Christian Democratic People's Party as parties which have common roots with my own party, are close to each other in their aims, and therefore are parties which natural allies. This is indicated by the fact that even the European and international organizations, originally, according to their own value system, regarded these parties as political parties of the same origin which could be related to one another, at that time when, in 1989, still in the stage of being in opposition, at my initiative, they [European and international organizations] admitted them into their ranks.

Even in the present situation I do not wish to change the composition of the coalition, and I trust that the internal democracy of the parties forming the coalition will solve the existing conflicts.

Second, as far as I know, the speaker of the House has asked two committees of the National Assembly to investigate and to prepare a draft standpoint regarding the matter of the parliamentary group of deputies of the Independent Smallholders' Party. Accepting the fact that neither the government nor the prime minister is entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of the National Assembly, I cannot take a stand which differs from the earlier one in the matter of the group of deputies, until the matter is settled within the parliament.

Third, the seventh paragraph of the Constitution deals in detail with the forming, operation, and tasks as well as the question of responsibility of the government. I consider the government itself and the whole of the government as well in the light of these rules. As far as I know, the ministers and state secretaries perform their duties according to the laws and legal regulations concerning them, irrespective of the question of which party they are members or whether they are nonparty personalities. It is my conviction that those political basic principles which constitute the foundation of a common government program for the members of the government are still present at the preparation of government decisions.

With regard to all of these, I cannot see any reason for changing my standpoint on the composition of the government I have had until now, because of the current situation.

Finally, I establish as a fact that, accepting an invitation from the majority deputy group led by Mr. Deputy Gyula Pasztor, I took part in their meeting together with Mr. Chairman Surjan at which they assured the government and the members of the government of their unchanged support.

However, I have taken the stand in my press statements that I regard the deputies who support the government coalition as part of the coalition. According to my conviction, however, several of those deputies who left the deputies' group, invariably support the coalition. Regarding the person of Mr. Chairman Jozsef Torgyan, the special fact that he initiated legal proceedings against the prime minister and three ministers certainly causes difficulties—although it does not cause any governmental disturbance or constitutional crisis, it does symbolize the lack of unclouded cooperation.

Finance Ministry Presents 1992 Draft Budget

LD0212163591 Budapest MTI in English 1431 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 2 (MTI-Econews)—Hungary is certainly going to have its work cut out keeping next year's budget deficit under the planned 70 billion forints, Peter Kiraly, state secretary at the Ministry of Finance, is quoted as saying in today's edition of the Budapest economic daily NAPI VILAGGAZDASAG (DAILY WORLD ECONOMY). He added that the balance was rather precarious.

"The entire prognosis could turn out to be worthless if the expenditures side were to be upset," Kiraly told the paper. The 1992 draft budget, which comes before

parliament today, envisages revenues of 984,012 billion forints and expenditures of 1,053,414 billion forints. These targets are to be achieved via a 6 to 9-per-cent increase in exports and an increase of 3-5 per cent in imports next year.

Kiraly stressed that maintaining the country's external balances was a top priority. He said that although the country had managed to keep its external and internal payments balanced in 1991, the balance was rather precarious. The state secretary believes that the main risk lies in an increase in domestic demand, which is not covered by an appropriate rise in export revenues.

Kiraly considered it dangerous that certain groups, such as entrepreneurs and unions, are pushing for larger budget expenditures just to cushion social tensions. If domestic demand grows for reasons other than a growth in exports, Kiraly told the paper, the ensuing import rise could upset the central budget.

He said the chief problem in the present economic structure was that no surplus income can be generated, meaning expenditures have to be tailored to incomes. "If we want to distribute more, we'll have to resort to a new tax squeeze," he added.

Kiraly noted that the new budget lacked an appropriate infrastructural development scheme. Kiraly said that in his view the central budget deficit should not be expressed in absolute figures: rather, it should be integrated into economic processes. He added that the central budget deficit will exceed the planned figure by at least 25 billion forints this year.

The deficit grew by 20 billion forints at the beginning of 1991, he explained, because the originally-calculated incomes were raised by 10 billion forints at the proposal of lawmakers, and 10 billion forints was paid back to companies in tax refunds.

Submitted to National Assembly

LD0312232891 Budapest MTI in English 1850 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 3 (MTI)—Reducing inflation, the easing of employment and social tensions and economic restructuring have been given special emphasis in the bill on the 1992 state budget currently being studied by MPs [members of parliament] in the Hungarian parliament.

According to the draft submitted by the government, expenditures will total 1053.4 billion forints, while revenues will run to 984 billion forints. To finance the resulting deficit of 69.4 billion forints, parliament will authorize the finance minister to issue 30 billion forints worth of securities to be purchased by the National Bank of Hungary. The finance minister will also be frec to issue a new state bond worth 30 billion forints and increase the stock of treasury bills and other state securities by 9.4 billion forints.

The country's foreign balance will improve, hard-currency reserves will increase and the national debt will decrease, the bill predicts. On the other hand, production is expected to decline by 8-10 per cent, and the unemployment rate rise to 7-8. Investment spending will be 8-10 per cent less than this year and personal consumption will decrease by a further 8-9 per cent.

Total public finance expenditures will represent 62.3 per cent of the GDP, down from 66.4 per cent this year.

Justice Ministry Views Amendment to Law on Spying

AU0312090591 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Nov 91 p 4

[Interview with Karoly Bard, deputy state secretary at the Justice Ministry, by Andras Sereg; place and date not given: "We Asked—Why Are There New Regulations on Spying?"]

[Text] The bill on the penal code recently accepted by the government sets up new rules on spying because, according to the preamble, it is no longer the practice to sign enlistment documents.

We interviewed Karoly Bard on the background of the proposal to amend the law.

[Bard] In the current Penal Code, there are two statements that refer to spying organizations, handing over information obtained by spying and state secrets or military service secrets, and this has caused serious problems of definition. The amendment proposal will bridge over the contradiction by stating that a person can be convicted for spying if he carries out intelligence work to the detriment of the Hungarian Republic, or if he is aware of being in connection with a foreign intelligence organization.

[Sereg] The proposal talks about intelligence organizations rather than spying organizations. Why is that?

[Bard] In most constitutional states, intelligence is subordinated to the government, and it is also under the control of parliament. Therefore, we thought it was appropriate not to qualify these organizations as spying organizations in the future. The other reason for the amendment is that the current Penal Code starts from an old model of enlistment, whereby the person offering or undertaking to do intelligence work made some kind of statement of intention to carry out spying activity. However, in practice, there are much looser forms of enlistment or maintaining contact. Therefore, the proposal starts from the premise that spying is performed by a person who is conscious of the fact that he is connected with an intelligence organization, and carries out intelligence work for this organization. In other words, the amendment is clearly intended to help overcome the difficulties in applying the law, even though we know that this kind of crime is very rare.

Walesa Cables Ukrainian Leader on Recognition

LD0312194591 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1900 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] President Lech Walesa sent Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Leonid Kravchuk a congratulatory telegram. Poland is today the first to recognize Ukraine as a state, we read in the telegram, and decides to establish diplomatic relations with her. I am convinced, writes Lech Walesa, that further cooperation between our states will be beneficial, for the good of our nations and for the whole of Europe.

Lithuanian Suggestion of Polish 'Threat' Denied

LD0312223591 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1900 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] The Polish Embassy in Vilnius has issued an official denial in connection with an interview given by Lithuanian Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius for the paper LIETUVOS AIDAS, in which he suggested the existence of a military and political threat from Poland.

The embassy categorically rejects such accusations and states that Poland does not threaten and has no intention of creating a threat to any of its neighbors. It stresses that Poland stands firm on the principles specified in the CSCE documents and will not forsake its efforts in support of the construction of peace and political stabilization on our continent. Any suggestion that the Polish side seeks a change in the present state of the borders in Europe is without foundation and does not serve the development of Polish-Lithuanian relations.

Economic Official Views Effect of EC Association

AU0212153491 Warsaw PAP in English 2303 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 27—It is estimated that as a result of her association with the EC, Poland will be able to increase her exports of industrial goods by 20 percent and to export farming produce worth 150 million U.S. dollars a year, Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Andrzej Olechowski told a news conference on Wednesday.

The agreement on association will take effect as of January 1 or March 1, 1992, he added.

The moment it becomes effective, tariffs will be lifted on 55 percent of Polish exports. As concerns 23 percent of Poland's exports, that is glass, china, cars, footwear and chemical products, tariffs will be lifted gradually over four years by 15 percent each year and finally abolished in the fifth year.

The moment the association agreement comes into effect, the sides will specify quotas of duty-free goods. On the average, those quotas reach 60 percent of Polish current exports and will increase by 20 percent annually, Olechowski stated.

With regard to controversial exports of Polish steel and textiles, it has been decided that tariffs will be lifted on the former by January 1, 1997, and on the latter on January 1, 1998.

By estimates the EC will lower the average tariff on Polish products by 77 percent in 1992.

After January 1, 1998, tariffs will be lifted in relation to industrial goods.

Although the EC has made big concessions in agriculture, opening itself for Polish vegetables, fruits, poultry, pork and its products, a free market will not be possible in this field for a long time because of immense differences between its agricultural policy and the Polish one, the deputy minister told newsmen.

Making use of the asymmetrical character of the agreement, Poland will start with a very moderate liberalisation of imports of EC industrial goods and lift tariffs on raw and intermediate materials and investment equipment. The liberalisation of trade in ready products will begin as of January 1, 1995. The Polish market and producers will be protected by a special clause under which tariffs might be changed because of important reasons, Olechowski said.

Says EC No Threat to Agriculture

LD0312230591 Warsaw PAP in English 2003 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 3—Deputy minister for foreign economic relations rejected Tuesday the charges of the Rural Development Council that Poland's association agreement with the European Communities (EC) poses a threat to the Polish agriculture.

Andrzej Olechowski, who was Poland's negotiator in the association talks, termed as groundless the claims that the EC gained the possibility of strict control of the access of Polish foodstuffs to the EC markets.

In return for the reduction of customs duties and other payments covering nearly 53 per cent of Polish exports to the EC markets Poland will cut by 10 points customs duties on 18 per cent of commodities imported from the EC, Olechowski said.

Poland's association agreement with the EC is but the first step towards integration of this country with Western Europe. This process will be especially complicated when agriculture is concerned. Misleading opinions may only hamper this process, Olechowski warned.

Five-Party Coalition Wants New IMF Agreement

LD0312203291 Warsaw PAP in English 1759 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 3—Consultations held here Tuesday show that the coalition of the five centre-right parties differ considerably in their assessment of Poland's relations with the International Monetary Fund

(IMF), but all consider it necessary to renegotiate Poland's agreements with the Fund.

During the meeting of the economic team of the "five" Stefan Kurowski of the Centre Alliance (PC) claimed Poland's relations with the IMF over the past two years were not based on equal footing. His view was shared by four parties of the coalition: the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), the Christian National Union (ZCHN), the Centre Alliance (PC), and the Peasant Agreement (PL).

However, the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) is of the opinion that it is necessary to maintain good relations with the IMF in order to ensure the inflow of credits and capital to Poland.

The KLD also claims Poland has little, if any, possibilities of manoeuvre and should accept certain terms of the Fund.

Also today, the coalition's representatives examine the presidential draft of the "small constitution" which considerably expands the prerogatives of the president and envisages the possibility for the Council of Ministers of issuing decrees with the force of law.

Coalition Unaninmous on Need for Economic Change

LD3011170191 Warsaw PAP in English 2202 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 29—The team of economic experts of the five-party coalition declared Friday they were unanimous about the need to change the philosophy of economic management in Poland and came in favour of a policy of budget cuts and increased income. The experts representing the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) the Centre Alliance (CP) the Christian National Union (ZChN) the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) and the Peasant Agreement (PL) met here to exchange views on the future common economic policy of the coalition. The team shared the view that the Army should be spared budget cuts, but they did not rule out the eventual liquidation of subsidies for those enterprises which waste them. They were also of the opinion that health service and education should be treated with special care, Gabriel Janowski (PL) declared. Asked about chances to reach budget equilibrium Janowski told newsmen that this is a matter of more than a year, regardless of what government is in office. In the opinion of the team, the success of the future budget policy lies in a fundamental change of the philosophy of managing the state assets.

'Stormy' Center Alliance Congress Debate Reported

LD3011221391 Warsaw PAP in English 2104 GMT 30 Nov 91

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 30—The main political council of the Centre Alliance (PC) at its meeting in Warsaw November 30 rejected by a majority of votes a motion by some of its members to convene extraordinary congress of the PC in January 1992. The PC council voiced support for hitherto actions by the PC parliamentary floor group and PC Chairman Jaroslaw Kaczynski to form a majority parliamentary coalition and establish a government led by lawyer Jan Olszewski. The meeting of the PC Council was held in camera. Information leaked to the press indicates that this was a stormy debate with the extraordinary congress motion being a sore spot.

PC Deputy Chairman Marcin Przybylowicz termed the motion a dissenting one. Stefan Kurowski, one of those who tabled the motion, told PAP that contrary to the statutes the PC Main Council was not allowed to express its opinion on PC candidates to Parliament. Kurowski said the PC was not democratically run and that it was in a great danger of being run by dictatorial methods. Jaroslaw Kaczynski said he planned to solve the problem by way of talks. Making reference to the coalition of the five centre-right parties now seeking to form a cabinet, Adam Glapinski said the PC was willing to hold talks with the Democratic Union and the Polish Peasant Party. Slawomir Siwek said the Council also decided to dissolve the PC provincial boards in Krakow and Slupsk. He said the decision was caused by internal organizational problems and that new elections would be held before the end of January 1992.

KLD's Tusk Views Party's 'Difficult Situation'

AU0312115291

[Editorial Report] Warsaw TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC in Polish on 29 November on page 3 carries a 1,300-word interview with Donald Tusk, leader of the Liberal-Democratic Congress [KLD], on forming a coalition government.

Tusk complains about the difficulties in which the KLD has found itself: "The congress has found itself in a very difficult situation because it is too small a party to dictate conditions, and at the same time it is too stubborn in adhering to its principles," he says. "As a result, it is difficult but, nevertheless, necessary to find a setup that will make it possible to forge a majority coalition that is acceptable to the president and safeguards the continuation of the reforms."

According to Tusk, the KLD is taking part in talks with other political partners with a view to reaching a favorable compromise concerning the next government.

Tusk describes the outgoing prime minister and KLD member Jan Krzysztof Bielecki as a "very good candidate for prime minister," but adds that the fundamental question is whether the parliamentary majority would have any influence on in the formation of the cabinet. "If we agreed to the candidature of Bielecki in tune with the president's intention and in opposition to Parliament's will, the president would be able to form the kind of government that is suitable to him," he says.

Concerning the possibility of talks with the Democratic Union, which won the greatest number of seats in the 27 October parliamentary elections, but was rejected as a partner by the coalition of five center-right parties, Tusk states that his party is not going to cause a split within the coalition for the sake of the Democratic Union as far as the formation of the government is concerned. "However, the KLD might hold bilateral talks with the Democratic Union on significant issues to appear on the Sejm's agenda," he says.

Referring to basic programmatic differences between the KLD and other parties forming the coalition, i.e. the Confederation for Independent Poland, Peasant Alliance, Christian National Union, and Center Accord he says: "Ideology should be excluded from talks on the new government and from its future work."

Peasant Accord To Become Coalition Party

AU0212201791 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Nov 91 p 1

[Ewa K. Czaczkowska report]

[Text] The Peasant Accord, an election coalition consisting of the Solidarity Polish Peasant Party, Mikolajczyk Polish Peasant Party, and Private Farmers' Solidarity, will become a political party. This decision was reached by representatives of local election committees and People's Accord deputies and sympathizers at a meeting in Warsaw on Wednesday. Without a doubt, this is a major illustration of the process of forming new, natural parliamentary alliances.

In practice, it means a merger of the two Polish Peasant Parties into a single group, to which Private Farmers Solidarity activists—which will retain its identity—may also belong.

The initiative of forming the new political group was taken by the People's Accord Deputies Club, which has appointed a 10-man working team to form regional founding committees of the new party and organize a congress, which will probably take place in March.

It is not yet known what the new party will be called, but most of the Wednesday meetings' participants said they want to see the present name "People's Accord" retained. Not many agreed with the Solidarity Polish Peasant Party's National Council suggestion that the new party be called a "Christian People's Party." The new group will be addressed to the whole people, not just a particular social class, and will bear a center-right-wing orientation. It is also considered that the conversion of the People's Accord into a party will tidy up programmatic affairs and separate trade union issues from political ones.

Council of Ministers Adopts Economic, Social Plan

LD0312223491 Warsaw PAP in English 2000 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 3—The Council of Ministers on Tuesday formally adopted its economic and social strategy for Poland for 1992, saying that it should focus on halting recession while maintaining the basic elements of economic stabilisation.

The government of outgoing Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki wants to maintain the downward trend in annual inflation rate, improve the home market, keep the convertibility of the Polish currency, and preserve a safe level of foreign currency reserves but is aware that all this will have to be done in difficult social and political conditions.

To get out of the recession, the government plans to put more emphasis on privatization, changes in the banking system, stable and consistent policy towards state-owned enterprises, competition, proper price policy, broader use of external funds, and support for Polish exports.

The condition of the state budget, however, is going to be the main problem threatening the stability of the national economy in 1992. Preliminary estimates indicate that next years budget deficit may be much higher than this year.

Meanwhile, the government will probably have to appeal to the Sejm (lower house) for approval to increase this years budget deficit by another 4 trillion zlotys (under 400,000,000 dollars) to be channelled primarily for old-age and disability pensions, Government Spokesman Andrzej Zarebski announced on Tuesday.

Resolves Radio, Television Issue

LD0312224491 Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish 1830 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Today, the Council of Ministers solved the issue of a transmitting base for radio and television. Negotiations between the Radio and Television Committee and the Ministry of Communications have led to a compromise. Polish Radio and Television will receive gratis part of the shares of the "Telekomunkacja Polska SA" company being formed, which will be the owner of the transmitting equipment. Two representatives of the Radio and Television Committee will sit in the 11-member company supervisory council.

[Warsaw TVP Television Network in Polish at 1830 GMT on 3 December adds: "The president refused to sign the Law on Radio and Television and requested the Sejm to examine it once again. Justifying himself, the president wrote that the law did not create the expected legal framework for the functioning and organization of radio and television within the new socioeconomic realities."]

Hungarian Foreign Commission Delegation Visits

Horn Denies 'Revisionist Yearnings'

AU0312151591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1410 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 3/12/1991—The delegation of the Commission for Foreign Relations of Hungary's parliament, headed by Gyula Horn, that is paying a visit to Romania, had Tuesday, December 3, an interview with members of the Commission for Foreign Policy of Romania's parliament.

Saying that this second interview between the two commissions of the Romanian and Hungarian parliaments represents an important step in easing the tensions in the bilateral relations, Ion Timis, the deputy chairman of the Commission for Foreign Policy said: "Romania does not relate its links with Hungary to the manner of treating the Hungarian minority. I don't think there is a Hungarian problem in Romania, in the sense of the Romanian people having anti-Hungarian feelings, said Mr. Timis. There are only extremist attitudes and ambitions."

For his part, expressing his wish that this visit contribute to finding new ways of cooperation between the two countries, Mr. Gyula Horn mentioned: "We are of the opinion that we have to help each other, and in this way come close to Europe."

The Hungarian parliamentarian referred, among other things, to certain statements on the so-called "revisionist yearnings" of Hungary as regards the Romanian frontiers and territory. Mr. Horn mentioned that Hungary's parliament as well as most of the Hungarian people have no such yearnings and considered such statements to be groundless.

Meets Assembly Group Leaders

AU0412150291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1348 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 4/12/1991—The delegation of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Hungarian parliament led by Gyula Horn had an interview on Wednesday, December 4, with leaders of political parties represented to the Senate and the Assembly of Deputies.

Showing that both Romania and Hungary were aiming at European integration, Mr. Dan Lazarescu, leader of the Liberal Parliamentary Group in the Assembly of Deputies, pointed out that the peoples of the two countries had the duty, after a millennium of negative experience, to understand the imperative of the current moment and to contribute to understanding and conciliation.

Mr. Gyula Horn reiterated the viewpoint of Hungarian parliamentarians according to which all problems related to the links between Romania and Hungary should be approached in an open way. In that context he expressed confidence in the improvement of bilateral relations in areas in which that thing was possible, showing that "the area of minorities should not be forgotten either."

Both sides agreed that an intensification of bilateral contacts on a parliamentary and other level was both necessary and possible in the current stage.

Commodity Exchange Protocol Signed With SFRY

AU2711210291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1802 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 27/11/1991—A master protocol was signed in Bucharest on November 27, between the Government of Romania and the Federal Executive Council of the Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on goods and services exchanges in 1992.

The document stipulates that the commercial exchanges in 1992 should be based on lists of goods and services of a guiding character and the contracts be negotiated and signed by economic agents in the two countries at world prices. The Yugoslav party expressed interest in the possibility that the economic agents may achieve also other mutual deliveries in forms and ways used in the world market.

Romania intends to import from Serbia electricity, steam coal, copper and copper products, cables, metallurgical coke, raw materials for detergents, etc., against exports of metallurgical products, chemicals, building materials. The above-mentioned lists estimate a volume of balanced commercial exchanges worth some 500 million dollars.

Also, the parties pledged to assist the economic agents in the two countries in operations of compensation, processing, in keeping with their interests and possibilities, under deals and contracts on long terms, consistent with the current legislations in the two countries of transition to a free market economy.

Cioflina Signs Military Accord With Greece

AU0312110891 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0912 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 3/12/1991—Greece and Romania signed on Monday [2 December] in Athens an agreement of military cooperation as part of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness, concluded on November 28 in Bucharest. The document was signed by General Dumitru Cioflina, secretary of state, the Romanian Ministry of Defence, and chief of staff, and General Ioannis Veryvakis, chief of staff of the Greek Army.

The agreement provides for exchanges of visits between chiefs of staff, battleship, cooperation between air forces and the navies, as well as in military medicine, military education, between military geography services and the

specialty publications, as well as mutual information on the conventional arms limitation.

In a statement to the press General Dumitru Cioflina said that Romania was resolved to enlarge its relations with Greece, as the Greek-Romanian cooperation can help in the climate of stability, security and friendship in the Balkans.

Roman Rejects 'Third Way,' Profiles New FSN

Part I

AU0312122591 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 29 Nov 91 p 2

["News Conference of the National Salvation Front, 27 November 1991: 'With One's Back to the Past'"]

[Text] [Roman] Just one introductory word in connection with the abusive interpretation made by the BBC correspondent after our discussion at the Foreign Press Club. You can obtain the content of that discussion any time from any of the participants. However, the thing that I think it is important and necessary to tell you now is that the subjects of the presidential elections, of the candidacies, and of the Iliescu-Roman conflict are not the political themes that we consider important and even decisive for our country. The political theme—the home theme, so to say—is that of the confrontation between political concepts. This is how things stand: We want to build a democratic system. This democratic system is, as experience has shown, the only system of reference we have, situated at the opposite pole of the communist system. If communism and democracy are at opposite poles and exclude each other, then there can be no third way; consequently, it means that those who support a third way inevitably support the old system. This is the political theme around which our entire political action as a party, within the National Salvation Front [FSN], revolves. The concepts have become ever more divergent, to the point of being at opposite poles, as I have already said; this is the stand we promote, both in the party's political bodies and in the party work and documents. I do not see the need for and I do not believe in the opinion or viewpoint of placing a personal conflict before or instead of a substantial political discussion about the successful establishment of democracy in our country. Democracy is far from being a reality, a truth, or something that all of us, all citizens feel day by day and hour by hour as having an impact upon our existence in society; our goal is to reach that stage of democracy. The fact that some people look back with complicity or tolerance upon the former communist system is, in my opinion, a disaster, something to be condemned; as if someone wants to move ahead backwards, looking back. This is dangerous, precarious, and unreliable. These are our intentions and we decided to make this the FSN's political line. I also said in the Front's political bodies: Until this party, which is still in the making, becomes the party of democracy in Romania, it cannot have credibility and cannot be a serious contender for Romania's political future. This is the statement I wanted to make. Now, I invite your questions.

[Unidentified correspondent] I would like to ask you if your statement marks an ever clearer turning point, a clearer definition of the Front's boundaries from its past image. In this connection, do you envisage, I do not want to say a purge, but maybe the cleansing of the Front of certain cadres whom you no longer consider fit for the policy you intend to promote?

[Roman] You see, this defining of our position is another asset for our party, since for a long time it has failed to project itself as such, as a departure from the past and a clear identification with the democratic system. Therefore, in this respect, there is a need for a departure from the past, but this should also become a concrete political action, because this departure must not limit itself to the realm of mere statements. Few people in Romania today favor the old system. However, the distance between words and the concrete acceptance of democracy in our lives can be very big at times. This is the kind of defining we are talking about. It also applies to inner party life, too.... I do not mean a purge, but there should be a certain rule of existence, a basic rule of this party that does not permit bridges to the past. This means the building and structuring of this party as a democratic grouping and a guarantee for the creation and establishment of a democratic system in our country.

[Unidentified correspondent] What concrete measures do you envisage for defining the Front's new image, particularly its local organizations in the country?

[Roman] Our primary obligation, of the party and myself, is to undertake a massive and programmatic political action, consulting the FSN supporters and electorate. This is something we have started and will continue to promote at an intensive and, if you like, even accelerated pace in the coming period. This would allow us to understand the wishes of the Front supporters and what kind of policy they want us, the Front, to promote in the country. I have received a great response from our supporters, which allows me to be optimistic and to note that the Front's supporters and militants truly and profoundly want this clear-cut commitment to democracy. In intend to steadily promote this action in the forthcoming period. As of tomorrow, we will be active in Cluj, then in Moldova, Prahova, and so forth. On this basis, we can define a program document specific to our party, with which we can go before the electorate. When all these things become clear, the voters will know whom to vote for.

[Unidentified correspondent] How do you assess President Iliescu's answer at last night's news conference regarding his relations with the Front, in general, and with yourself, in particular—with yourself not as a person, but as national leader of the Front?

[Roman] You know, there were two news conferences.

[Unidentified reporter] I am referring to last night's news conference.

[Roman] Last night's news conference does not stand on its own, without the other one. However, my answer is the same: To try to overlook this issue, which is very serious and important—namely what we want to build in Romania and to what extent we make a break with the past—well, it is not good and right simply to reduce it to a confrontation, or, as he said, to personal self-pride.

Part II

AU0412101591 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 30 Nov 91 p 2

["News Conference of the National Salvation Front, 27 November 1991: 'With One's Back to the Past'"]

[Text] This term is unsuitable and it surprises me that it comes from a person with such wide political experience. I do not intend to launch an attack from this point of view. It is clear that this defining of our position springs from our having ascertained that there are people who wish us to preserve and have in one way or another a middle road, which I believe, as I have mentioned before, can only be a new road, not the road of the old regime and of the old rules. This defining of our position is based on what certain people do, mostly those who hold power and who are placed in centers of power. But when the debate becomes political, substantial, and meaningful, then one can clearly see who places himself where and who wants to go where. And at this point, I let you and all the people in this country judge when, where, and how this defining of our position arises and in connection with what theme it arises.

[Unidentified correspondent] You have referred to the issue of discussing political substance. Do you believe that President Iliescu had political options that run counter to this transitional tendency or are there less visible actions, which we could call actions with a different nuance?

[Roman] What is happening in the background I can only speculate on and I avoid doing so. There is enough speculation in the press, even excessive speculation. However, in connection with what is out in the daylight, I give my viewpoint and my opinion every time. Maybe I have not said it loud enough and at the right time or maybe I have not said it when it should have been said. This is also part of politics: to realize that at one point you made a mistake by not saying something on time, by not saying it when you should have said it, and maybe you did not emphasize sufficiently certain things in connection with one fact or another. I have done it on several occasions and this is the position I am taking now, too. Let us make it clear, every time differing positions emerge—and what is the reason for these differing positions?—one should not resort to demagogy anymore, particularly to populist demagogy, and one should not resort to communist-type pressure (whose fault is it? why?). Are we forgetting the economic disaster, the disaster that we face after long years of communism? That is the origin of all the troubles! We can talk about the mistakes in Roman's way of governing. There were some of those and I can tell you better than you could tell me about them. But first of all let us see what has been broken with, what has been changed irreversibly and in an enduring way in our country in order to avoid another unfortunate experience such as we have had.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Roman, you head a party which in turn is part of a political convention—I am referring to the Convention for Democracy. Do you believe that your declaration and in general the line that you have adopted now will influence the composition of this convention? Do you envisage any modifications?

[Roman] It is difficult to tell. What I am convinced about is that the current political line and the current political attitude does not differ at all from the line of the Charter of the Convention for Democracy. Therefore, it should not lead to rearrangements except when they are connected with political attitudes. Basically, I fail to see why there should be any modification.

[Unidentified correspondent] Very clear-cut splits have already occurred in many opposition parties—the National Liberal Party or the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party. Why can what happened in other parties not happen in the Front? In other words, we want to know very precisely what the situation is within the Front. You are surrounded by a team at the top of the Front. Is this the new National Salvation Front? And what happens to the rest?

[Roman] You see, one might say this is both the old one and the new one. Because all the people you see here were involved in the Front's political departments before, too. I am referring to the ones that were elected during the National Convention held last March. I neither like, nor am I happy with the idea of how good it would be to have a split within the National Salvation Front, too. It would be much better for everyone—in consensus with what the sympathizers and the militants of the Front or at least a great majority of them think—to ensure the operation of the Front as a party, as a clear, correct, developing functional organizational structure, that is prepared for the electoral campaign. Therefore, we need this structuring for the sake of those of us and of the electorate who hope that we are going to win a majority at the next elections.

[Unidentified correspondent] Can we assume that it would be very desirable—regardless of certain opinions from the inside or the outside—and that it is extremely necessary for the Front to enter the general elections as one party and not two?

[Roman] My answer is the one I gave you previously and it stays the same.

[Unidentified correspondent] Thus, only one Front.

[Roman] That front and that party for which the political option is clear cut—the option of the future and with one's back to the past.

Iliescu Discusses Economy With Labor Group

AU2711212491 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1806 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 27/11/1991—Romania's president, Ion Iliescu, received Wednesday, November 27, a delegation of the "Metal" National Confederation, with which he tackled the new tendencies of the union movement in Romania.

After the interview, Mrs. Georgeta Basarabescu, leader of the "Metal" National Confederation, based at Galati, told the journalists accredited to the Cotroceni Palace that the scission was discussed of the union movement, caused by the withdrawal from the Government-Trade Union Joint Commission, of three federations, i.e. "Alfa," "Fratia" and "the National Council of Romania's Free Unions." The danger was also referred to, that trade unions meddle in politics in the period to come, when elections will be held. President Ion Iliescu promised he would "facilitate talks with Premier Stolojan as regards the keeping into force of the joint commission, as the only body in which an official dialogue can be conducted between the government and trade unions." Important issues of today's economic and social life in Romania, such as the unemployment, financial blockage, correlations between prices and mark ups, the quality of the pensioners' life were the centerpiece of the talks held Wednesday, November 27, at Cotroceni Palace, between Romania's president, Ion Iliescu and a delegation [of the] Union Federation of the Textile, Readymade-Knitwear, Hide, Rubber and Shoe Units, and directors-general of relevant commercial companies.

"We discussed aspects of the correlation among the rate of profit, the commission asked by importers, and the mark up," Marin Mosteanu, the leader of the federation said after the interview. He added that "such a correlation is necessary, for the level of prices to diminish in the end by 30-40 percent." He also mentioned: "As far as I could understand, the president will inform the executive about the issues, opinions and solutions we suggested, which are going to be analysed."

For his part, Ion Sandor, director-general of "Flaros" commercial company of Bucharest said that "President Iliescu showed good will as regards the issues raised by the union federation and employers of that industrial branch."

PUNR Urges Supporters To Vote for Constitution

AU0312151791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1241 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 3/12/1991—The Party of the Romanian National Unity, PUNR, asked his members and followers to vote "for" in the referendum on the constitution.

In a communique sent to "ROMPRES" to be relayed, the PUNR leaders considered that "a good constitution was adopted, that Romania badly needs."

The communique adds that "those who are trying to convince the Romanian citizens to abstain from vote, by the circulation of leaflets included, have no substantial arguments, but resort to formal aspects. Their game, many times made in alliance with the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, is obviously directed against fundamental interests of the Romanian people. The referendum will equally be a test for the Hungarian minority of Romania," says the document, that expresses, in its final part, the PUNR confidence in the maturity and responsibility of the citizens that will vote for the constitution.

Unemployment Rate Reported at Three Percent

AU0312112591 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0916 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 3/12/1991—191,433 people were on the pay rolls of the Romanian unemployment offices on 2 December, 116,097 of which were women; 158,784 were workers, 26,385 high school graduates and 6,264 higher institute graduates. Unemployment offices have offered work places to 35,094 people so far.

Leading places as far as unemployment is concerned are held by Bucharest, 10,838 people, the counties of Neamt—8,529; Vaslui—8,206; Constanta—7,966; Iasi—7,464. The counties of Timis, Harghita, Salaj have reported lower unemployment figures. Some other 80 thousand people have applied for a work place, including 55 thousand women, but they have not met legal requirements to be granted unemployment benefits.

As for work place offers on December 2, they amounted to 4,000 places, 3,300 of which for workers. Labour and social protection departments have been organising training courses, for which 11,267 people have already applied.

The current unemployment rate is of 3 percent (men 2.2 percent and women 4 percent).

International

Tudjman Greets Soviet Ambassador Shikin in Zagreb

LD0312173791 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] The president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, received in Zagreb today the new Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, Gennadiy Serafimovich Shikin, who was accompanied by the Soviet consul general in Zagreb, Yuriy Girenko. Ambassador Shikin stressed that USSR's interest is in the quickest possible end to the war in Croatia and in the establishment of mutually good relations.

He evinced special interest in the international recognition of Croatia soon and in the arrival of UN [peacekeeping] units.

Welcoming the Soviet Government's principled stance, President Tudjman stressed, among other things, that the role of the Soviet Union in the international isolation of the aggressor should be even more vigorous. Having reiterated that the Soviet Union complies with and has the intention of complying with the embargo on arms deliveries, Ambassador Shikin refuted the rumors about Soviet pilots and experts being sent to Yugoslavia.

Stipe Mesic, President of the Yugoslav Presidency, received the new Soviet ambassador as well. The new Soviet ambassador, Gennadiy Serafimovich Shikin, was also received by Dr. Zarko Domljan, president of the Croatian Sabor [Assembly].

Vance Meets With Novi Sad Corps Commander

LD0312154791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1444 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Dalj, Dec 3 (TANJUG)—Cyrus Vance, special envoy of the United Nations secretary-general, met today in the village of Dalj in Eastern Slavonia with the commander of the Novi Sad Corps of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), Major General Andrija Biorcevic, and discussed with him how the 14th cease-fire in this crisis zone was being observed.

An official statement issued after the meeting said General Biorcevic had "praised highly all Vance's efforts for accomplishing a lasting peace."

General Biorcevic said he, his command and all JNA servicemen were doing all in their might to achieve a lasting peace.

After his meeting with Biorcevic, Vance left for Osijek, where he is set to discuss the same issues with representatives of the Croatian authorities.

General Biorcevic told TANJUG after the talks that Vance had asked how far the JNA was honouring the cease-fire and if it was opening fire on Osijek.

"My response was negative, but I stressed that the Croatian paramilitary formations were infiltrating out rear positions—in the past few days days we destroyed eight such groups and shot down about ten of their agricultural aicraft," General Biorcevic said, adding that he did not believe the Croatian side would respect the latest cease-fire, given that seven JNA soldiers had already been killed since it had come into effect.

Apart from this, he said, according to information we have the Croatian paramilitary formations are regrouping and preparing for a new attack.

"We are all in favour of a peaceful solution to the problem and the war we are waging is a defensive one, but we shall respond to every provocation," General Biorcevic said.

Kucan Expresses Support for 'Blue Helmets'

LD0312200291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1912 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Bonn, December 3 (TANJUG)—President of the Presidency of the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia Milan Kucan today said that United Nations peacekeeping forces should be deployed, after a lasting cease-fire is established, along the borders between the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia and the Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, but also in the troublespots.

Kucan told a press conference here that Slovenia was ready to offer rear and other support to the blue helmets, underscoring that a contract to that effect should be signed between Slovenia and the UN nevertheless.

Following his talks with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Kucan underscored that Germany was determined formally to recognize Slovenia by Christmas. He added that Kohl had told him that Germany would try to get as many countries as possible to do the same and that Slovenia be offered a contract on association with the European Community and membership on the Council of Europe at the earliest possible date.

Slovenia declared its independence through a unilateral decision in June this year.

Kucan also said that Slovenia has a foreign debt of 1.7 billion dollars, of which around 20 percent is owed to Germany.

Federal

Jovic Evaluates PRC, Venezuela Trips, Talks

AU0312181291 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1935 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Interview with Borisav Jovic, member of the SFRY Presidency, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given]

[Text] [Correspondent] Mr. Jovic, the SFRY Presidency has recently intensified its activities abroad, especially in non-European countries. You recently visited China and Venezuela. Could you please evaluate your visits and the talks you held there?

[Jovic] The activities of the SFRY Presidency on the international scene, the non-European scene, are connected with events, with the shifting of the Yugoslav crisis in the United Nations, where, as is known, other countries also make decisions, not just European countries. What we particularly needed was a more detailed explanation of the Yugoslav crisis and its causes to friendly countries in Asia, Africa, and America, to explain our view on how it should be resolved, and to explain our view on what should be done and what we expect to be done in the Security Council of the United Nations.

Therefore, we decided on a program of activities and contacts with certain countries. The visits that I paid recently included talks with China and 10 other countries that were represented by their presidents at a special meeting in Venezuela. The meeting was used for talks on these issues. As has been reported, the meeting was attended by India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Senegal, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, and Mexico.

[Correspondent] India and Zimbabwe are currently members of the Security Council.

[Jovic] Yes. Venezuela will become a member of the Security Council on 1 January. Of course, China is a permanent member of the Security Council. In this way we actually held talks with four Security Council members who are directly deciding on the fate of Yugoslavia. We also held numerous talks with friendly countries which play important roles and have influence in the United Nations.

[Correspondent] What was agreed upon? How is our crisis viewed?

[Jovic] First of all, I would like to say that these contacts enabled us to explain in a most authoritative manner to a large number of world statesmen the essence of the Yugoslav crisis, its causes, and the ways we think it should be resolved, as well as all the games around Yugoslavia, all the problems that have arisen in connection with the attempt to resolve the Yugoslav crisis in the way that has so far been mostly unsuccessful within the EC, and to explain all the confusion and possible disagreements concerning the Yugoslav crisis.

I must say that this was a very good opportunity for world leaders to clarify all the questions that they might have had in view of their distance from our country, and in view of the enormous pressure exerted by the various propaganda centers on world public opinion and on the world statesmen themselves. I think that this was a very positive turnaround in the direction of understanding the true state of affairs, and in the direction of accepting a logical and rational way of resolving the Yugoslav crisis.

Regarding the results of the talks concerning the Yugoslav crisis, I can say that we can be completely satisfied. First of all, the very fact that these states agreed to talk to Yugoslavia at this moment and in this way proves that they recognize Yugoslavia, that they respect it as a subject of international law, that they have all sympathy for Yugoslavia, and that they wish the crisis to be resolved. They are prepared to involve themselves in this in a constructive way.

Therefore, they reject the attempts to discredit the official Yugoslav organs, attempts to impose the view that Yugoslavia no longer exists. They are amazed to see that some countries are doing such a thing, that they are inclined to accept secession as the way of solving international problems, and that they favor secession instead of rejecting it energetically and thereby protecting the international legal order. All collocutors held the view that this way of resolving the crisis in Yugoslavia, the method that Europe is trying to impose—breaking up Yugoslavia and creating several republics—is very dangerous for the international community and unacceptable. Therefore, they hold the view that the maximum possible should be done to resolve the problem in a democratic way through an agreement with the Yugoslav peoples, but not by forcing dissolution of the state because some want to leave Yugoslavia.

Another important result of the talks is energetic opposition to pressures in international relations, to threats, and the punishment that is being applied against Yugoslavia by the EC. This is not acceptable and is seen as a method of pressure. It is also considered unacceptable to introduce an oil embargo against Yugoslavia, because this is such a rigorous measure of punishing a people and an economy which has absolutely nothing to do with international legal principles. The view was that this is not the way to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. Therefore, all members of the Security Council and other participants categorically agreed that this cannot be approved in the United Nations.

[Correspondent] This measure is not included in the latest resolution, Resolution 721. The meeting, however, was actually in the context of a debate on the new world order.

[Jovic] Yes, that measure was not included in the resolution. I must say that these talks, with China in particular, have influenced world public opinion on this issue, and that this partly influenced the initiators of the resolution on the embargo [word indistinct] Yugoslavia. The fact that the SFRY Presidency proposed a more effective measure of resolving the Yugoslav crisis, namely the deployment of the blue helmets to separate the warring sides in Yugoslavia and create conditions for a peaceful denouement of the Yugoslav problems and crisis, has also partly influenced that decision.

The fact that this measure was well received in the world organization and considered by the world at large to be the correct way of resolving the crisis, was an obstacle, that is to say, a factor that made those who proposed the resolution on an oil embargo to retreat a bit. Neither of these facts, however, mean that the threat of an oil embargo has disappeared. This problem is still present because the proponents of the embargo have not abandoned their proposal. They are also thinking not only about establishing peace in Yugoslavia, which may be achieved and we believe will be achieved in the way we embarked on, but also about having a powerful means of exerting political pressure on Yugoslavia, its peoples, and its republics to accept the political solutions which suit those who proposed the embargo.

This is why it will be necessary for us to continue international activities to prevent this, with a policy of uniting those countries that can prevent such a decision. As is known, for that we either need to have the majority of the members of the Security Council against such a decision, or to have a veto by at least one country. Of course, it would be much more favorable for the world organization to be united, and we are working on it.

[Correspondent] In connection with this, Mr. Jovic, some West European agencies commented that Yugoslavia, that is, Serbia, is turning toward the nonaligned countries and developing countries because it is being virtually isolated by the western world. What is your comment on that?

[Jovic] I will deal with this question now, although I have not finished with your question in connection with the effects of our situation on international order. As is known, the operation of the international system has been seriously endangered by the very fact that attempts are being made to apply on our country some norms that do not even exist in international acts. These norms are, in fact, being applied in the wrong way. International acts state that the territorial integrity of every country is guaranteed, that external borders are guaranteed, that internal systems are guaranteed, then that there should not be interference in internal affairs, and so forth. As the whole world has seen, an attempt is being made to resolve the Yugoslav crisis in a completely opposite fashion: by recognizing internal but not external borders, by allowing the disintegration of the country, by recognizing secession as an equal right of the state to exist, that is, as a supra- sovereign right, a right which is beyond what is rightfully exercised by a unified country. In this way the international order is distorted through the actual behavior of some powers toward Yugoslavia, and this may be transformed in a rule of behavior toward other countries, depending on the large countries' needs.

Discussing this situation at the summit in Venezuela, we came to a joint conclusion that the 15 countries at the summit, that are members of that organization, should launch an initiative for studying the world order and its application in the new circumstances when there is one large power, one world power, through which attempts can be made to impose all kinds of solutions as a rule, regardless of whether this is in line with the rules of behavior in the international community. We also concluded that we must unite ourselves in self-defense against such behavior, whether through unified actions in world organizations as self-defense, or whether through the correction of norms adopted by the world-wide organizations so that all countries can be protected from such arrogant behavior.

This is a very important result of these talks, and I must say that it was greatly influenced by what we said about Yugoslavia's position and the application of the rules of behavior in the international community regarding our case.

Regarding Serbia and its turning toward the nonaligned countries, I cannot talk about it now. I can say that as far as Yugoslavia is concerned, even Serbia, we cooperate with all countries in the world in line with our interests and in line with the actual possibilities for cooperation. Nonaligned countries have played an important role in a period of world development because they represented a balance in international relations. We never abandoned cooperation with Europe and other countries, and with the developed countries, neither as Serbia nor os Yugoslavia, and we do have a reason to it in the future. However, this does not mean that we will abandon all our friends and potential economic and other forms cooperation in other parts of the world.

After all, that part of the world can today represent an element of balance in international relations when the two world powers which had been providing balance in international relations have disappeared. It is not accidental that the Republic of China has decided to ask for observer status in the Nonaligned Movement. China did this, at least this is how they explained this to me and this is how I understand it, because it has concluded that an imbalance has been created in international relations. At present, one superpower is one side, while on the other side the entire world must be united in order not to have unsuitable solutions imposed on it.

[Correspondent] One last question, Mr. Jovic. The EC decided today to apply sanctions selectively. They will be applied against Serbia and Montenegro. Other republics have been taken off the list. What is your view?

[Jovic] My view is very simple and clear. This is only the confirmation that the forces which have set themselves the task of breaking up Yugoslavia have prevailed in Europe, in the EC. They prevailed in solving this concrete issue because they imposed the view that the measures should not be applied against Yugoslavia, that they should not deal with Yugoslavia, but to deal with some of its parts. In this way they actually want not only to revenge themselves against the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro, which hold different stands because of the defense of their vital interests, but also want to make a step forward toward the actual division of Yugoslavia.

Of course, they will succeed in this in terms of economic punishment, but whether they will succeed in accomplishing their aims is a big question. I do not believe so, because Serbia and Montenegro cannot sacrifice their vital interests just because they are going to be punished economically.

[Correspondent] Disregarding the well-known stand of some EC members, are the doors to dialogue closed? Is there still a chance to make them change their view, to change their view on the Yugoslav crisis?

[Jovic] On the Yugoslav crisis as a whole? I do not think that the doors for dialogue and possibilities have been closed, because one should proceed from the fact that the Yugoslav crisis cannot be resolved through imposed solutions. In the event solutions that are not acceptable to all are imposed, this could lead to more serious clashes and bloodshed. This would not be a solution at all. Those who really want the Yugoslav crisis resolved must be absolutely clear that the crisis must be resolved in the way that would be acceptable to all. Otherwise, it can only escalate. The current pressures are intended to extract solutions. The extraction of solutions could lead to solutions which are not solutions. This method should therefore be abandoned.

Ministry 'Certain' EC Will Annul Sanctions

LD0312181191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1654 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 3 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry today said it was certain that the European Community (E.C.) would annul the unilateral implementation of sanctions against the Yugoslav republics of Serbia and Montenegro "as a form of discrimination in the relations between the E.C. and Yugoslavia."

The ministry statement assessed that the decision on sanctions and their implementation would not contribute to the resolving of the Yugoslav crisis, and especially to the peace efforts at the Yugoslavia conference in The Hague, nor to the activities of the United Nations (U.N.), "especially if a differential approach is applied."

In this way, the statement says, "confidence in the unbiased stand of international factor is shaken, the European Community in particular, to resolve the complex problems which the Yugoslav community is facing."

"The implementation of these methods is counterproductive and we expect that the E.C. will have this in mind when these issues are considered once again," said the statement which also recalls that all political factors in Yugoslavia have accepted the constructive role of the E.C. in seeking a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis.

Foreign Ministry Criticizes EC Sanctions

LD0312230691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1528 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 3 Dec (TANJUG)—The Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs has stated again today its stand that the decision on sanctions and their application in principle does not contribute to resolving the Yugoslav crisis, and especially not to the peace efforts in The Hague, nor to the activities of the UN in this respect."

The secretariat stresses that the sanctions will not contribute to the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis "especially not if, regardless of the motivation, a differentiated approach is being used." The secretariat says that in this way no contribution can be made to seeking permanent solutions because this, at the same time, ruins confidence in the impartiality of the international factor, especially of the EC, in the resolution of exceptionally complex problems faced by the Yugoslav community.

"That is why we consider," the statement adds, "that the use of these methods is essentially counterproductive and we expect that the EC will take this into consideration during its next discussion of these or similar issues. We are also convinced that the unilateral application of the sanctions will be cancelled as being a kind of discrimination in relations between the EC and Yugoslavia. This should be prompted by the fact that all the political factors in Yugoslavia have accepted and supported the constructive and active role of the EC in the search for a peaceful and democratic solution to the Yugoslav crisis, and for a future constitution of the Yugoslav community which will suit the interest of all the republics and nations."

General Kadijevic Describes Military Situation

LD0312202191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1729 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 3 Dec (TANJUG)—Tomorrow's issue of NARODNA ARMIJA carries an interview with Army General Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary of national defense.

Answering the first question, General Kadijevic said that the situation in Yugoslavia is characterized by two parallel processes. On the one hand there are the aggressive actions of the supporters of secession and the wrecking of Yugoslavia, who want to attain their objectives by a policy of fait accompli, revenge-seeking and war. In this respect they have substantial foreign support and help, especially from countries that were losers in the two world wars. In the changed balance of forces in Europe these countries, and especially Germany, see their chance of attaining their strategic objectives in our area, the Balkans.

On the other hand are the forces which do not accept the policy of fait accompli and which see the prospect of their peaceful life and of their economic, cultural and any other kind of prosperity in the establishment of a new Yugoslavia as a modern democratic country of equal citizens and nations.

Did all this have to happen? Could Yugoslavia yet be preserved in its existing borders, was the next question put to him by NARODNA ARMIJA journalists.

History will give its judgement on what has been happening in our country during the past decades and years. It was clear to me a long time ago that Yugoslavia, as established by virtue of the 1974 constitution, could not survive [odrzati se], the federal secretary of national defense said. The state system based on that constitution quite obviously, by the internal logic of its action, led to its ultimate end. Of course, this end could have been different, much more favorable for the peoples of Yugoslavia, but the end of the Yugoslav state established by the 1974 constitution was inevitable. It is perhaps clear to any serious analyst now that all those who think that the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] could essentially change something in this respect are wrong.

Assessing the situation on the battlefields, General Kadijevic said :

I keep reiterating that the Army did not want this war. And not only that. It did everything to prevent it. Unfortunately, it was imposed on us and we had to accept it. We had to foil the thrust of fascism and the repetition of genocide against the Serbian people in Croatia, and to protect our people in the blocked garrisons. It is and it has been our Army's commitment to defend the right of those among our peoples who refuse to accept division and brutal negation of all the achievements of our life together over many decades.

The Army has victoriously completed the present stage of the war and has opened up the conditions whereby the controversial issues can be resolved by political means rather than by the use of force. However, if the warmongering forces fail to see reason, I am sure that they will again be not only defeated [potucen] but finished off [dotucen], regardless of what support they get from their foreign masters.

The JNA did not prepare for such a war. Many classical ideas and values on which we based our defense system were not useful to us. We had to initiate a comprehensive transformation of the Army and the doctrine on how to use it, General Kadijevic said, and went on to speak about the the transformation of the JNA.

It is completely certain that the JNA, as a state institution, could not remain intact in a Yugoslavia which was going through a dramatic change. Parallel to the process of rapid social changes was the process of changing the Army which is still underway, both as regards the Army's role and also as regards its cadre and overall structure.

Under the fierce onslaught of nationalistic and other divisions in society, internal disintegration of the JNA was inevitable. The well-known problems in the sphere of recruitment brought about a big reduction in the number of soldiers, and as a result mobilization became an important factor of combat readiness. At a time when we in practice had to show the whole world that we were not aggressors nor that we acted against the will of any nation, but that we were only defending what we had to defend, because of which the aims of the war are strictly politically limited, it was completely clear that traditional principles of combat skills, particularly in the sphere of strategy, were of little use. We needed to look for new solutions under constant pressure from fierce and well-synchronized attacks from within the country and abroad, while we did not have a law-governed state which would really take care of its army.

We have stoically endured, Kadijevic added, and have overcome everything—our own shortcomings caused by long-standing mistakes both in the sphere of war doctrine, which was based on an idea of an ideal self-managing homogenous Yugoslav society, and also in the sphere of internal structure of the armed forces which was adequate to such a doctrine. We are rapidly getting rid of ethnic quotas in the cadre policy, which are at odds with the nature of every sound military organization. Thanks to that, we have repulsed external and internal pressures of all kinds and defeated the Ustasha Army just as much as was necessary to achieve the political aims of the war, and as much as international circumstances allowed.

The Army cadre bore the main brunt, by their self-sacrificing, courageous and creative attitude in carrying out extremely complex tasks which were new in many ways, amid a very complicated situation.

In addition to the transformation of the Army and the doctrine of its use, what are the essential strategic factors or problems facing the Army during this war, was the next question put to the federal secretary of national defense.

I will list them in sequence of the impact they had on the present course and outcome of the war. First, the non-existence of an adequate Yugoslav federal state to fulfill its share of war commitments, with the result that this had to be done by the army instead, although it was not ready for this, Kadijevic said. Second, the organized hampering of mobilization was an exceptionally important factor affecting the overall combat capabilities of our armed forces. It is well known what was done to foil timely and efficient mobilization, as well as who took part in this "game," ranging from our proven enemies to cowards and deserters not unknown to all wars in history, and to petty and dirty would-be politicians who are not choosy about what means they use to grab power, even if this has to be done behind foreign skirts. It is also common knowledge that the measures taken by appropriate political and state institutions, and also by military organs, to nullify these negative effects with speed and efficiency largely failed to materialize. Third, from the very start, unfavorable international circumstances have been in play, and for the time there is an explicitly German influence. In terms of the strategic factors of which I am speaking, the actual combat value and capability of Ustasha formations comes last.

The urgent task now is to establish peace, General Kadijevic said. More consistent compliance with the cease-fire agreement and other commitments undertaken in The Hague and recently in Geneva should be

the basis for this. The JNA will comply with these agreements. The Army has no plans to conquer Croat territories, but it has very precise plans, and now sufficient strength too, to free its units blocked in the garrisons in Croatia if the agreement on lifting the blockade on them and on their transfer is not complied with. I made it clear to everyone on whom the implementation of the agreement depends that there are no circumstances that will prevent the Army from using all the forces and facilities at its disposal to free its blocked units.

My view is known, that no one who does not want to live in Yugoslavia should have to do so against his will, but by the same token the will and right of those peoples who want to stay in the joint state may not be denied either. That is why we have been suggesting over a long period of time that the process of setting up a new Yugoslavia should be accelerated and the country's future resolved. The role of foreign parties should be reduced to goodwill services (if they are good), and they should not decide about our future, especially not through dictates and by threatening sanctions. I addressed the SFRY Presidency on 22 October, putting forward these proposals and stands. The public was informed at the time that the proposals had been accepted.

The Army command firmly adheres to its well-known stance that it will not impose its political views on society and the appropriate institutions. However, personally I have not been happy either with the speed or the way the 22 October SFRY Presidency conclusions have been applied so far, said Army General Veljko Kadijevic, federal secretary of national defense, at the end of his NARODNA ARMIJA interview.

General Negovanovic Discusses JNA, UN Troops

92BA0168A Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Nov 91 p 6

[Unattributed article including interview with General Marko Negovanovic, assistant federal secretary for national defense for moral upbringing and legal affairs, in Belgrade; date not given: "Topola Is Being Defended in Gospic"]

[Text] After answering questions about the illegal importation of arms into Croatia last October (which our newspaper covered in a special issue on 26 January) and then concerning the false allegations of Slovenia's top political leadership that the July war on the soil of Slovenia was won through superb intelligence, and about the unified command on the battlefield, governed by the principle of one commander in one combat zone, General Marko Negovanovic, when asked about defeatism and desertions, replied that this is a key question, and he related it to the mobilization that is the guarantee that the goals and tasks will be realized, adding:

"Vis-a-vis the Croatian forces (about 180,000), we ourselves must have a level of armed forces in strength and structure to be able to ensure an adequate balance of power and the outcome that is necessary if we are to achieve the goals that have been set before us. That is why these mobilizations have been ordered. Nothing, of course, is easy. We have encountered difficulties. There have been failures to report. There have been desertions. There have also been people leaving their posts. We have asked ourselves what the reasons are for this. You know what those who did that have said—that we were not ready, that this is treason. They, of course, needed some line of argument to rationalize their behavior, which certainly from the standpoint of ethics and patriotism, at least in this country, has always been condemned, regardless of what motives are involved. I would not go into that at this point.

"There have been shortcomings on our part that cannot be denied; it would be dishonest for me not to say so. But those shortcomings were not of such nature as to really be the causes of that. Second, we are in the situation when a state of war has not been proclaimed, and third, there were also those who thought that the Army was fighting to preserve a system, and there are probably some even now.

"And fourth—I think that this is the key thing—our people who did not realize the kind of true danger that threatened, that what is happening, say, in Gospic is threatening someone in Topola, and that Topola is being defended in Gospic, and not, as some are saying, defend Topola in Topola."

When the newsmen referred to the 25,000 or 30,000 refugees from Croatia said to be in Serbia now, "who might wage war and come from the regions where the war is being waged, while young people from here are going there to wage war," Gen. Negovanovic said that he agreed completely with that thinking, emphasizing that the "Serbs in Croatia cannot be defended against genocide unless they are prepared to defend themselves. That is the first thing, there are around 30,000 people from those regions who are able to fight. I do not have the figures at hand on how many are carrying a gun at this moment. Accordingly, there are reserves, and I completely agree with you that their place is not here, but there."

To the question of how much the mobilization and "in general in these times of war and rebellion" the red star is a hindrance as an ideological symbol, Gen. Negovanovic replied:

"The change of insignia that is now taking place in the Army is a part of the overall changes that have occurred. The red star is a recognized symbol of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] in international law, because the symbol must be worn if a man is to bear arms, wear a uniform, and so on. The red star is not just an ideological symbol. That is a false imputation. There are many five-pointed stars, no one thinks anything of it, but only the red one has been given that ideological attribute. The United States has a white five-pointed star, and there are a hundred other five-pointed stars in the world, and no one thinks anything of it. In our case, it is also a symbol

of the fight for freedom. It was under that symbol that we achieved what we achieved."

[NARODNA ARMIJA] But also a symbol of bolshevism?

[Negovanovic] Just a moment, that is another connotation that has also been imputed to it. Accordingly, all of us who have been under it know what it is and ourselves feel a certain resistance, there is also a lack of understanding, there are emotions, there are all sorts of things. That is one side of the issue. But what was achieved under it, and what was constructive, must be respected. To go further, other generations have come along and they want different ideological symbols. But because the Army must be unified, we said that the Army must carry the symbol of the state to which it belongs, because the Army is in fact an institution of the state.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] The question is of what state?

[Negovanovic] Yes, and of what state?

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Of the remainder of Yugoslavia?

[Negovanovic] I would not use that expression, "remainder of Yugoslavia," but quite simply of "Yugoslavia." Monoethnic armies have disintegrated, and probably the issue will be raised at some point of how we ourselves held out and remained when the state disintegrated. We have held out, but I must tell you it has been very difficult. The Army must find a firm support in the state and in those nationalities that embrace it as theirs. That makes it logical, on the basis of that same right that those have who want to leave—and no one is going to use force to prevent them from leaving—but they cannot take with them as a dowry those others who do not want to leave. If they have the right to destroy Yugoslavia by a policy of fait accompli, why, then, does the other side not have the right to halt that destructive process?

That is why we are rather an army in a state of transformation, an army, if I might so put it, that is adapting to those new conditions.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] Yet slowly and sloppily.

[Negovanovic] We are not sloppy. The question is what you mean by sloppiness? Some have even been criticizing us for having a bad conception. We were prepared to defend against external aggression, and so we built an army of Yugoslavia in the small, and units of Yugoslavia in the small, but processes took a different course, and independent states were created, and then republic economies, and that is how it has all gone, and that over a period of 30 years, and we did not adapt to that.

At this point, I asked the theoreticians: How could we have adapted? Does it mean that the Army should have become divided just as they became divided?

What would that mean today, because then there would be no protection for the Serbian population there. When the national armies are divided up, then it stays here and you no longer can cross the border, that is another state, and that is a quite different issue.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] In answer to the question of how it is that "a short time ago it was said that UN troops would be aggressors, and now they are being called in," the assistant federal secretary for national defense said....

[Negovanovic] There are two approaches. One is the approach that assumes that the peacekeeping troops truly perform their function as the Security Council orders. There are precise rules. The other approach is quite different—that it should guarantee the secession. There are those in the Croatian Supreme Command who favor acceptance of peacekeeping forces, but they would be on the border between Serbia and Croatia. Even Mesic is now saying in Rome that they should surround Serbia as a whole, and that means guaranteeing Croatia's secession, that is, genocide against the Serbian people in Croatia.

Regardless of that, we, and I am referring to those of us who want to live in Yugoslavia, will get what we are prepared to gain and defend with the saber. That must be clear to everyone. Within the framework of the objectives that we have, where our soldier stands and holds his ground, that can also be defended politically. The peacekeeping forces are not combat forces, and this does not presuppose withdrawal of the forces of the JNA. They have remained in the areas that are the hotbeds of crisis; the JNA remains along with those forces until there are political solutions.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] How will the Army react if the world community, the United Nations, and so on, insist that the peacekeeping forces go to the existing, that is, republic administrative borders?

[Negovanovic] We will not accept that.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] What is the consequence?

[Negovanovic] The consequence? Continuation of the conflict.

[NARODNA ARMIJA] The top military leadership has not reacted publicly to the demand of the Presidency.

[Negovanovic] There is nothing to state in public. The Army must carry out the demands of the Presidency.

Slovenia

Rupel Urges Stiffer Sanctions for Serbia

LD0312202291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1923 GMT 3 Nov 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 3 Dec (TANJUG)—In a letter to the foreign ministers of the EC member countries, Slovene Foreign Affairs Minister Dimitrij Rupel has urged the international community to undertake stiffer sanctions against Serbia and to recognize all republics desiring recognition. In the letter, in which he analyzes relations

between Slovenia and Yugoslavia, Rupel cites that, despite of its willingness and efforts to resolve problems by agreement, Slovenia has been de facto excluded from the SFRY. This refers to the financial, monetary, and payments systems, from which it was excluded by the end of July. He also noted that Slovenes were dismissed from diplomatic and other federal services on 8 October. Rupel then goes on to point out that the right to vote was taken from the Slovene representative in the Yugoslav Presidency, when the Presidency was deciding in its capacity of the supreme commander of the armed forces.

Slovene representatives are not taking part in the work of the rump and illegitimate federal bodies. The federal customs administration passed a decree in October according to which goods from Slovenia transported through other countries (for instance Hungary) are registered as foreign goods. Slovenia was excluded from all Yugoslavia's foreign activities. The federal bodies withdraw Slovenia's license for air traffic, and licenses to export goods were not given to Slovene enterprises, Dimitrij Rupel says in his letter to the EC foreign ministers. According to Rupel, the putschist four in the SFRY Presidency are preparing new measures against Slovenia. So, Slovenia has met all conditions for international recognition, especially because it cannot influence Serbian and Yugoslav People's Army policy and actions.

Serbia's conquest, Rupel says, can be halted only by a resolute and concrete action of all Western countries, which ought to say to the Serbian and Army top that the current borders are unchangable. Rupel is requesting that the international community demand that Serbia and the Army withdraw from the Croatian territory right away, and to sever all political, diplomatic, economic, and other ties with it. Rupel concludes his letter by saying that the recognition of republics wanting it, specifically Slovenia and Croatia, would send a clear sign to Serbia that its blackmail is over.

Croatia

Separovic Calls For 'New Marshall Plan'

AU0412100491 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 0600 GMT 4 Dec 91

[Report by Martin Konrad]

[Text] Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic stopped over at Graz Thalerhof Airport yesterday evening. He had come from Belgium where he had negotiated on financial and humanitarian help with politicians from EC countries. Before Separovic continued his journey to Zagreb yesterday evening, he reported on the results of these talks. Martin Konrad reports:

[Konrad] A Marshall plan is to rebuild Croatia, Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic says. In the past few days, he had talks with Spanish and Portuguese colleagues in Brussels. There he was above all interested in two main points: First, humanitarian aid and, second, the reconstruction of Croatian industry.

Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic is convinced that Croatia and Slovenia will be internationally recognized:

[Begin Separovic recording] Not only the question of recognition—which will come very soon, in our opinion—but particularly help for the destroyed Croatian industry—whole settlements, cities, monuments, churches—and help for rebuilding Croatia in the sense of a new Marshall Plan for Croatia are at issue. [end recording]

The Spanish and Portuguese politicians reacted positively to Separovic's proposals. Therefore, this Marshall Plan will be the focus of a talk that Zvonimir Separovic and Franjo Tudjman will hold with Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher in Bonn.

The Croatian foreign minister thanks the Austrian Government because:

[Begin Separovic recording] Austria is prepared to represent Croatian interests abroad in humanitarian matters, but, as we believe, also in other respects. [end recording]

Separovic is optimistic about the future. He said that the war will soon be over, although the fighting between the Yugoslav Army and the Croats has continued in the past few days.

[Begin Separovic recording] We believe that the European countries, but also others will help Croatia to get out of this war as soon as possible and that they will bring help. [end recording]

Ministry Appeals to UN, EC Over 'Genocide'

LD0312173891 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia sent a letter today to the chairman of The Hague conference on Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, the special envoy of the UN secretary general, Cyrus Vance, the chairman of the UN Security Council, Vorontsov, and the ministers of foreign affairs of the CSCE and EC countries.

The letter says that the cease-fire agreed upon in Geneva on 23 November 1991 has not been observed. It goes on to say that the units of the so-called Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] and Serbian and Montenegrin forces are continuing attacks on the territory of Croatia, obviously trying to conquer as much land as possible before the UN peacekeeping forces come—particularly in the area of Vinkovci, Osijek, and other towns—and neither is the situation in Dubrovnik favorable. We also express our indignation over the theft of library books, paintings, and other cultural wealth from Vukovar.

All this deeply upsets us, and hence we are calling on you to do everything you can to exercise pressure on the international public so that we can achieve a cease-fire, so that the evacuation of the JNA and other occupying units which are deployed on the territory of the Republic of Croatia be carried out, and so that the blockade of ports, air space, and roads in Croatia be lifted. We are

calling on you in this connection to influence the sending of the UN peacekeeping forces to Croatia as soon as possible and help us to establish a cease-fire.

Apart from that, we were astonished to learn that the occupying forces in Baranja request the Croatian population to leave their homes in five days, homes into which the Serbian population should then move immediately afterwards. This, and our knowledge of the fact that the occupying authorities in Baranja are implementing a monstrous measure, according to which the Croats must wear an armband as the Jews had to in Nazi times, clearly speaks about the character of the aggression, its goals, and the classic genocide which is being committed on the Croats, in their own occupied country, concludes the letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.

Agreement Reached on JNA Evacuation From Sibenik

AU0312211891 Belgrade RTV Sat TV in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Report by Dusko Petrovic]

[Text] Today's round of negotiations between the representatives of the Knin corps and the Croatian side, in the presence of the EC observers' mission for Dalmatia, in Pakovo Selo on the road to Sibenik ended late in the afternoon.

The main topic of the talks was the evacuation of the military materiel from the garrison of the Yugoslav Peoples Army [JNA] in Sibenik, that is to say, they discussed the expediency of the relocation, security of the convoy, and the fulfillment of other provisions contained in the agreement. They also discussed Drnis.

We have outlined the technical details of evacuation, General Lieutenant Vladimir Vukovic, commander of the Knin corps, stated among other things after the talks. He also said that the Army will consider the proposal relating to Drnis put forward by Drazen Budisa, a member of the Croatian Government. Budisa proposed that the Army pull out of Drnis prior to the arrival of blue helmets. He also proposed that the Croatian Army does not enter Drnis, but that civilian authorities are established in the town in the presence of the Croatian police. Budisa also said that the evacuation of the military materiel from Split and Divulje will continue tomorrow.

Representatives of the Croatian media have taken an unfair attitude toward General Vukovic, who was answering their provocative questions with dignity and patience. Drazen Budisa apologized for the behavior of the representatives of the Croatian media .

The next meeting of the negotiators is scheduled for tomorrow in the village of Zitnic, which is under the control of the JNA.

Blockade Lifted on All Seaports, Not Dubrovnik

LD0312174691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1557 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Split, December 3 (TANJUG)—All Adriatic seaports except Dubrovnik were fully unblocked at 1215 hours local time (1115 GMT) today, the Split Port Administration informed all radio stations on the coast.

According to the Croatian Northern and Central Adriatic Command, the evacuation of Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) units from Split and Divulje, halted eight days ago, was resumed today by removal from the barrack Dracevac.

Military vehicles are heading for the naval base Lora, from where the troops and equipment will be transported by sea to a port in the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro.

Lora will be evacuated last from the Split complex, after Divulje and after all troops and equipment from the Split garrisons have passed through Lora on their way to Montenegro.

Traffic in ports in the Dubrovnik region will continue as until now, i.e., with permits from the local military command and control of cargo, until a final solution has been reached between the JNA and the Dubrovnik authorities.

Serbia

Jovanovic Rejects Criticism of Rights Issues

LD0312234791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2027 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 3 Dec (TANJUG)—Some European countries are trying to impose a solution on Yugoslavia which goes far beyond what is envisaged by CSCE principles, which is to give national minorities in our country rights which are considerably greater than the rights national minorities have in the EC countries, Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said at Belgrade's Faculty of Law tonight.

Participating in a human rights debate organized in connection with the 150th anniversary of Belgrade's Faculty of Law, Minister Jovanovic said that Serbia should be proud of the level of rights enjoyed by its national minorities. It is a fact that there are already two political and cultural autonomous entities in Serbia. There is nothing like it in any other Yugoslav republic.

Jovanovic said the essence of the Kosovo province problem is not human rights but the abuse of the rights enjoyed by the Albanian nationality [albanska narodnost]. They are trying to win the right to self-determination and secession, and they have been enjoying the support of neighboring Albania on this over

a period of many years, although national minorities do not have these rights anywhere, either in Europe or in the world.

Results of Poll on Political Affiliation

92BA0134C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 91 p 10

[Unattributed article from the Institute for Political Studies: "The Maturing of Civil Society"]

[Text] The attitude toward political freedom was tested with respect to the freedom of organizing political parties. However irrelevant and superseded that question might seem, it seemed to us the most suitable one for testing the real attitude toward political freedom. After all, in a situation when political pluralism has been reduced to ethnic pluralism, and when this has generated brutal ethnic conflicts, the hypothesis could be framed that the real sincerity and consistency of the respondents' democratic commitment can be tested precisely with this question.

A convincing majority favored the free organization of political parties—81.6 percent of the citizens of Serbia, while 18.4 percent were against. A similar question was put in April 1990 to citizens of Belgrade, and then the percentage of those opposing the possibility of establishing political parties was considerably higher than what we are recording today in Serbia.

No Future for the Communists

As we have already said, the indicator on the attitude toward communist values with respect to production, distribution, authority, and political freedoms were collected for every respondent, and then the respondents were classified into two groups on the basis of whether their responses indicated a predominantly communist or noncommunist orientation. The communist orientation was predominant in the responses of 28.3 percent of the respondents, and the noncommunist in 71 percent. There was a pattern concerning this collective indicator in that the percentage of those with a procommunist commitment decreased with the education of the respondents, while there was an increase in the number of those with a noncommunist orientation. Thus, a communist orientation was shown by 46.6 percent of unskilled and semiskilled, 28.4 percent of skilled and highly skilled, 23.3 percent of individuals with secondary or junior postsecondary education, and 17.5 percent of those with senior postsecondary education. The noncommunist orientation was evident in 53.4 percent of the unskilled and semiskilled, 70.6 percent of the skilled and highly skilled, 75.2 percent with those who had completed secondary or junior postsecondary education, and 82.5 percent in those who had completed senior postsecondary education. The patterns evident in the previous questions were also evident in the other categories (age and occupation).

The figures presented show that Serbia has recovered from the addiction to communist values. This especially applies to those social strata whose time should now be coming—those are the young, the educated, private businessmen, and in general people in the private sector, while an above-average commitment to those values is found in those strata which in terms of age and productivity have no great future—those over age 55, pensioners, those employed in the socialized sector, those with less education, and so on. Another important conclusion is that the decline of communist commitment among citizens of Serbia did not generate a growth of anticommunism. In place of the previously higher communist orientation, there has only been an increase in an orientation that we might refer to as tolerant noncommunism, while the percentage of those who showed an anticommunist attitude in November of last year was 14.4 percent, and now it is 14 percent.

The Mistaken Trump Cards of the Opposition

This indicator is also very important in interpreting the outcome of last year's elections. BORBA recently published the results of a survey by the same team, which were taken as the basis for an attempt to determine the place of the parties in political space on the basis of the ethnic radicalism of their followers. Then an average value was given on the scale of radicalism concerning the Serbian nationality question for the entire electorate of Serbia, and it was 6.22 (on that scale zero signified complete indifference to nationality, and 10 signified 100-percent agreement with the most extreme solutions). This shows that the electorate of Serbia has been considerably radicalized from the ethnic standpoint and has come closer to the right-wing extreme. When these two values (the size and strength of anticommunist attitudes and the strength and influence of nationalism) are taken into account to interpret the results of the election, then the conclusion concerning them might be framed this way: If the electorate has been so seized upon by nationalism, then that means that the change of power could not have occurred through reliance on anticommunism, which is a marginal quantity in Serbian political space, but could only occur through a more radical nationalism. When the chances of being more radical in the ethnic sense than the government of that time and the present government were small (not only because of their proven "ethnic merits," but above all because of the propaganda apparatus, which could easily convince the citizen who should be believed in ethnic affairs and could demonize the only party that at that time was more radical in the true sense), this means that the question of the change of power could not have been resolved in that power diagram (nationalism, anticommunism) in which the opposition tried to solve it; in other words, that that question could have been solved (and can be solved) only by bringing in a new power, and that might be social dissatisfaction. The question, however, is how ready the opposition is to set that power in motion?

The Serbian electorate, then, although it is far from being bolshevik itself, is not changing its attitude toward confidence related to the nationality question (which also has been imposed upon it as the most important

issue) because of the bolshevik reputation of the leadership, whose trustworthiness is in question so long as it accepts the assurance that also has been imposed on it that that leadership can achieve what is expected of it. And it seems that Serbia is freeing itself of the inglorious attribute "bolshevik," which is obviously attributed to it because of the leadership. Those attributes are obviously bound up with the leadership's departure. But that leadership can depart together with its inglorious reputation only when it is shown that it is unable to achieve what was expected of it or when other expectations are placed before it.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Social Democrat on Effects of Economic Blockade

LD0312163491 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1406 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, 3 Dec (TANJUG)—It turns out that official policies of Croatia and Serbia toward Bosnia-Hercegovina do not differ much: They both treat Bosnia-Hercegovina as their spoils of war. This was confirmed by a decision of the Serbian Government on the economic blockade of Bosnia-Hercegovina, i.e. on the ban on selling agricultural products to this republic. That attack will affect Bosnia-Hercegovina much more than it seems, Zlatko Lagumdzija, vice chairman of the Socialist Democratic Party of Bosnia-Hercegovina, said at a news conference today.

Lagumdzija said that Bosnia-Hercegovina is "trapped", but that the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government has not reacted in an appropriate way, just as it happened, he said, in the case of destroying bridges on the river Sava or an attack on Bosanska Gradiska.

By passing the decision on an economic blockade of Bosnia-Hercegovina, he said, Serbia acted in contravention with its statements regarding the protection of the Serbs outside Serbia because the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina also will be hungry. In addition to that, he said, a new surge of inflation is coming, smuggling, corruption, and criminal activity of all kinds will push Bosnia-Hercegovina into an even more difficult situation. [passage omitted]

Muslim Youth Alliance Organizes Peace Rally

LD3011212191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1503 GMT 30 Nov 91

[Text] Bihac, 30 Nov (TANJUG)—The Bihac regional board of the Muslim Youth Alliance [Muslimanski Omladinski Savez] organized a peace rally attended by about 500 young men from Bihac, Cazin, Velika Kladusa, and Bosanska Krupa.

All speakers at the meeting underlined that peace is necessary in this area. The young people said that they will not allow others to impose a war on them.

We have urged demilitarization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and this remains our ideal and distant goal. It is ironic that Bosnia-Hercegovina is a piece of land with the highest concentration of Army and military equipment in Europe, said Fuad Balatic, a Muslim Youth Alliance member from Bihac.

Among the slogans at the rally, the following could be seen: "Give us pens, not kalashnikovs;" "We do not want to be pawns in someone else's game of chess;" and "We do not want dead heroes, but live brothers."

Montenegro

President Bulatovic Sees 'Speedy' End to War

LD2811214791 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0648 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Titograd, November 28 (TANJUG)—Momir Bulatovic, president of the Presidency of the Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro, is optimistic as regards a speedy ending of the war in Yugoslavia.

In an interview given to the Titograd daily POBJEDA and which the daily carries today, Bulatovic says that the 14th cease-fire, "just like the earlier thirteen, is not being honoured... but conditions have nevertheless been created to be realistically more optimistic" that the end of the war is in sight.

"It has proved that the protction of the rights of the Serbian people, who objectively and realistically speaking are still the only ones threatened in Yugoslavia at this time, has been a cause worthy of the effort," Bulatovic says.

The president of the tiny Yugoslav republic quotes the republic's unaltered position that "peace is a political objective which should be fought for to the end... but not at the price of renouncing the basic ideals and principles of life and state."

"Yugoslavia is above any ideology and, as an idea, it is much older than the present generation, stronger than any political concept and certainly has political future," Bulatovic says.

Macedonia

Gligorov Calls For International Recognition

LD0212195691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1859 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Skopje, December 2 (TANJUG)—Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov called the heads of state or government of all countries to recognize the independence of that Yugoslav republic, it was heard at a press conference on Monday [2 December].

Official recognition would make possible for Macedonia to "maintain relations with other countries on sincere

and stable foundations," Macedonian Foreign Minister Denko Maleski quoted Gligorov as saying in the letter.

"The territory of a recognized Macedonian state is not free to take," Maleski quoted Gligorov as saying.

Macedonia supports efforts by chairman of The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia Lord Carrington, the U.N. secretary-general's special envoy Cyrus Vance and the European Communty towards resolving the Yugoslav crisis, said Maleski.

Macedonia does not see its future in Yugoslavia if the crisis is not fully resolved soon, Maleski pointed out.

The Movement for All-Macedonian Action (MAAK), an influential Macedonian nationalist party, on Monday demanded that the republican parliament and government step up activities for Macedonia's gaining international recognition, together with the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia.

The party leadership reminded journalists of increasingly frequent statements by German, Italian and Austrian officials that these countries would recognize Croatia and Slovenia by Christmas.

Foreign Minister Discusses EC Sanctions

LD0312174291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1602 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Skopje, 3 Dec (TANJUG)—"The fact that Macedonia is exempt from EC sanctions is yet another acknowledgment of Macedonia's constructive policy toward the Yugoslav crisis," Denko Maleski, minister for relations with foreign countries in the Macedonian Government, told TANJUG today.

"I am not happy when anyone is targeted with sanctions," Maleski said and expressed hope that sanctions would be lifted against all republics by mid-December. "This clearly requires that arms fall silent and that we all sit at a conference table, the only place where our problems can be resolved."

The Macedonian minister for relations with foreign countries says that "this is a warning to Serbia and Montenegro. Europe is issuing the warning with the act of exemption."

Maleski feels developments could now unfold in two ways: either the use of arms will stop and talks will starts or a grip on two republcs will tighten. "I sincerely hope that the second option will not come about," Denko Maleski, the Macedonian minister for relations with foreign countries, concluded in his statement for TANJUG.

Assembly Continues Debate on New Constitution

92BA0134B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 16-17 Nov 91 p 7

[Article by D. Nikolic: "A Week of Skirmishing"]

[Text] Skoplje—The session of the Macedonian parliament, which since last Saturday [9 November] has been debating the new Macedonian constitution, continued yesterday, but once again it got no further than the beginning.

The session began under the troubled impression of yesterday's demonstrations, in which about 1,000 "komiti" bused in from Ohrid, Struga, and the western part of Macedonia took part. The Skoplje "komiti" did not join them, nor did those from any other Macedonian cities, even though buses were provided for them and they were invited over local radio stations and sound trucks to go to Skoplje.

However, those who arrived were very militant. In the late hours they went toward the building of Macedonian Radio-Television, demanding resignation of that corporation's general director along with all the editors whose last names end in "ic." They also demanded the resignation and death of Stojan Andov and deportation of Skipetars. They broke the window at the entrance to the building with a stone.

Offended "Hooligans"

Tihomir Ilievski, general director of Macedonian Radio-Television, called for representatives of the demonstrators to come for a talk, and on that occasion they told him that his news corporation was conducting a bolshevik-communist editorial policy, that they are under the influence of Serbian policy, and that they are giving the Macedonian public the wrong information about the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian Nationality]. They accused the reporters of calling the demonstrators "hooligans," of not saying that there were more than 20,000 participants, and said that all editors and reporters must therefore leave their jobs and be demoted. After that, the demonstrators who were left returned to the Parliament Building and dispersed sometime after midnight.

The demonstrators demanded that they be addressed by Kiro Gligorov, Stojan Andov, and other leaders in Macedonian politics, but they were addressed only by Todor Petrov, independent deputy, and Dimitar Crnomarov, vice president of the VMRO-DPMNE, who said that his party would not accept any other phrasing except that Macedonia be the parent national state of the Macedonian people, not the state of other nationalities. This did not satisfy the demonstrators, and they removed the Macedonian flags from the flagpoles in front of the Parliament Building and flew the party flags of the VMRO-DPMNE.

Mitko Atanasovski, VMRO-DPMNE deputy, explained in more detail in yesterday's debate in the parliament the point of removing those flags when he said "I see the downfall of the Jewish star," as he indicated the flags of Macedonia that are in the parliament chamber. Stojan Andov, president of the Assembly, called on him to apologize to the Jews because his words recall fascism,

when the Jews in Macedonia were deported to death camps, but Atanasovski refused to do so.

Stojan Andov attempted to conduct the debate of the constitution, but it turned into an interparty exchange of accusations by deputies of the VMRO-DPMNE and the Social Democrats.

Aleksandar Florovski of the VMRO-DPMNE accused Gligorov of having at one time declared that Macedonia was the national state of the Macedonian people, and now he will not stand by it. Kiro Gligorov responded that until a new constitution is adopted, Macedonia will be neither independent nor sovereign. The constitution must be the democratic charter of the Macedonian people, the basis for its recognition as a European nation, and for the Macedonian state as a member of the international community.

Interparty Accusations

Gligorov said that Macedonia has up to now avoided anyone's scenario and guaranteed the peace, just as it has gained prestige both within the country and in the world through its constructive policy, and that now we must not ruin that capital. He said that there is no doubt whatsoever that Macedonia is not a Macedonian state, because the Macedonian people live in it as the majority nationality.

Gligorov's speech was accompanied by lengthy and stormy applause (he was even applauded by some deputies of the VMRO-DPMNE), but even so he expressed doubt that adoption of the constitution would be unblocked, because it is expected that the VMRO-DPMNE will stand by its position, and the PDP [Democratic Prosperity Party] and NDP [People's Democratic Party] are not allowing Albanian deputies to vote in favor of the new constitution because they have submitted a request to The Hague that Albanians in Macedonia be granted special status.